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INTRODUCTION
A decade after the United States negotiated the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") with Mexico and Canada, it has
concluded similar agreements with Chile and Singapore, using
NAFTA as a model.' In fact, one can reasonably argue that one of
NAFTA's most enduring legacies may be in its influence on
subsequent regional trade agreements concluded by the United
States, including their investment provisions. NAFTA, the United
States - Chile Free Trade Agreement ("Chile FTA"), and the United
States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement ("Singapore FTA") each
include a chapter designed to provide a high level of protection to
foreign investors and investments.2 The investment protection
provisions of both new agreements are similar in some ways to
NAFTA's Chapter 11 ("Chapter 11"), but also incorporate some
significant changes.
The Chile FTA and Singapore FTA, while negotiated almost
simultaneously, have somewhat different histories. With Chile, the
initial plan was to integrate Chile into NAFTA. Intentions to
negotiate Chile's addition to NAFTA were first expressed in 1994,
and talks formally began in June 1995. 3 The Clinton administration
1. United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile,
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Chile FTA]; United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6,
2003, U.S.-Sing., available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/fmal/2004-
01-15-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Singapore FTA]; North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11; Chile FTA, supra note 1, ch. 10; Singapore
FTA, supra note 1, ch. 15.
3. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R.
REP. No. 108-224, pt. I, at 2 (2003) [hereinafter House Report] (noting that U.S.,
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considered the idea of including Chile in NAFTA as late as 1997
despite the fact that President Clinton's "fast track" negotiating
authority lapsed in mid-1994 and Congress failed to renew it during
his presidency.4 In 1996 and 1998, respectively, Chile concluded
bilateral FTAs with Canada and Mexico.' In mid-1999, Chile again
proposed bilateral FTA discussions, even though President Clinton
still lacked fast-track negotiating authority.6 It was not until the final
six weeks of the Clinton presidency that negotiations with Chile
began,7 in part because of U.S. exporters' increasing lack of
competitiveness when competing with Canadian and Mexican
exports to Chile. President George W. Bush resumed negotiations
with Chile almost immediately after taking office, and successfully
concluded the talks two years later.8
Canadian, and Mexican leaders announced their intention to negotiate Chile's
accession to NAFTA in December 1994); see also Full Slate of Negotiations
Underway on Chile's Entry to NAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jul. 28, 1995, at 5
(indicating the initiation of July 1995 negotiations to discuss Chile's accession to
NAFTA).
4. See Melissa Ann Miller, Note, Will the Circle be Unbroken? Chile's
Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 153, 178-
79 (1996) (outlining President Clinton's unsuccessful attempts to obtain fast-track
negotiating authority).
5. Tratado de Libre Comercio entre el Gobierno de la Repfiblica de Chile y el
Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Oct. 1, 1998,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/chmefta/indice.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Chile-Mexico FTA]; Free Trade Agreement between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Chile, Dec. 5, 1996,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/chican-e/chcatoc.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Canada-Chile FTA].
6. See Chilean Minister Presses Pre-Fast Track Bilateral U.S. Trade Talks,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 13, 1999, at 1 (noting efforts by Chile's minister of
foreign affairs to engage the United States in discussions).
7. See Chile FTA Labor, Environment Measures in Doubt with Bush
Administration Bilateral Negotiations - Chile and U.S. Officially Launch
Negotiations on Free Trade Pact, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 15, 2000, at 8 (noting
that the impending new administration caused many to doubt the Clinton
administration's ability to conclude an agreement with Chile).
8. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.
and Chile Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 11, 2002) (recognizing
President Bush's role in concluding the agreement and detailing the terms of the
accord), http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/12/02-114.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
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Although there was no similar history of discussion regarding a
FTA with Singapore, the Clinton administration proposed an FTA
with Singapore in the waning days of the administration. 9 This was
not a radical idea in light of Singapore's importance as a U.S. trading
partner in the Pacific. Moreover, Singapore's relatively high level of
economic development, absence of an agricultural sector, low
industrial tariffs, and stable and transparent economic system would
make for relatively smooth negotiations. ° Under the leadership of
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") Robert Zoellick, the Bush
administration quickly endorsed the Singapore FTA, and
energetically pursued negotiations that concluded in January 2003."
Both the Chile and Singapore agreements were subject to the "Trade
Promotion Authority" ("TPA") or "fast track" procedures of the
Trade Act of 2002.12
This article focuses on the U.S. experience with the
implementation of investment agreements as reflected in two specific
areas of jurisprudence under NAFTA Chapter 11 - "Minimum
Standard of Treatment"1 3 and "Expropriation."1 4 The discussion will
examine these issues through the prism of, and with emphasis on on
directly related changes in, U.S. investment law and policy since
1992, such as the TPA provisions, and the evolution (or lack thereof)
of the "customary international law" on protection of foreign
investments.
While significant differences exist between the two FTAs, most of
those relating to investment protection are relatively minor. The
9. See Congress, Business Surprised by Singapore FTA Announcement,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 24, 2000, at 1 (describing the goal of the Clinton
administration to complete an FTA deal with Singapore before President Bush
took office, and the controversy surrounding that decision).
10. See generally U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Singapore (detailing
how Singapore has acted as a beneficial trade partner and political ally to the
United States), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eiibgn/2798pfhtm (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
11. See U.S. Completes Deal with Singapore on Capital Controls, Freeing
FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 17, 2003, at I (describing the completion of the
Singapore FTA).
12. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-13 (2002).
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105.
14. Id. art. 1110.
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focus of the article is thus on the Chile FTA, and how it differs from
NAFTA in these areas. Where the Singapore FTA is different, those
differences are noted.
NAFTA's Chapter 11 essentially serves two purposes. First, it
provides a set of mandatory standards for treatment of foreign
investments and investors by host countries. 5 These include national
treatment, most-favored nation treatment, fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security, restrictions on
performance requirements, freedom to designate senior management
and boards of directors, freedom to transfer funds, and protection
against direct or indirect expropriation. 16
Second, NAFTA provides for binding arbitration of disputes
between foreign investors and their host governments under the rules
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL"), the World Bank's International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), or the ICSID's
"Additional Facility." 7 If an arbitral tribunal appointed under
NAFTA concludes that the host government has violated any of its
obligations under Chapter 11, the tribunal may require that
government to pay compensation to the complaining foreign
investor."s
Few are likely to object to providing just compensation to a
foreign investor if there is an outright seizure of private property by a
government. In the United States, for example, the Fifth Amendment
15. See id. arts. 1101-14 (setting forth the scope and coverage of Chapter 11,
[including standards of treatment to be adhered to by the Parties).
16. See id. arts. 1102, 1103, 1105-07, 1109-10 (mandating how host countries
must treat foreign investments and investors). Chapter 11 also includes many
reservations, art. 1108, most of which are listed on a country-by-country basis in
Annexes I, 1I and IV of NAFTA.
17. See id. art. 1120 (detailing rules for submission for a Chapter 11 claim to
arbitration).
18. See id. arts. 1110(2), 1116(1), & 1117(1). Only the provision relating to
expropriation, Article 1110(2), specifies how compensation is to be calculated).
For other violations of the obligations of Section A of Chapter 11, Articles 1116(1)
and 1117(1) refer only to "loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that
breach [of Section A or, in limited circumstances, of Articles 1502 and 1503 on
monopolies and state enterprises]." Id. arts. 1116(1), 1117(1).
683
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
would require just compensation. 19 Rather, the concern is over
various types of indirect expropriation, particularly in situations in
which a government could be required to compensate a foreign
investor because an otherwise valid governmental regulation
significantly reduces the value of the investor's property or property
rights."0 If such a right of compensation were established, the result
could have a chilling effect on the willingness of governments to
take regulatory actions necessary for the health and public welfare of
their citizens, including environmental regulatory actions.2 '
Similarly, relatively few would argue against an international
requirement for compensation when a government takes truly
outrageous acts against business interests, including flagrant denials
of due process or otherwise arbitrary actions.2 However, there is
considerable disagreement as to how serious or shocking a
government's action must be before it should be subject to
international protection. 23 All of us in our daily lives must cope with
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[n]o person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."). One could also argue that an
international agreement which provides foreign investors with greater rights
against the United States or state governments in investment disputes than are
afforded U.S. nationals under the U.S. Constitution would itself raise equal
protection concerns. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. Of course, under the U.S. constitutional
system, the law on indirect takings is unclear. See, e.g., Marisa Yee, The Future of
Environmental Regulation after Article 1110 of NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex
and Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 85, 89 (2002)
(examining the breadth and complexities of "takings" jurisprudence and
commentary in the United States).
20. See Don Henry, Editorial, Free-trade Clause Would Be a Dangerous
Weakening of the Law, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 27, 2003, at 15
(suggesting that an FTA with the United States could restrict Australia from in
regulating the use of property in the public interest), 2003 WL 66059983.
21. See Stefan Baumgarten, Canadian Group to Fight Methanex on NAFTA
MTBE Spat, CHEM. NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 4, 2004 (discussing increasing
concerns by environmental groups that Chapter 11 serves as a business tool for
corporations).
22. See Senate Report on the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002, Feb. 28,
2002, 107t" Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (indicating the desirability of incorporating in
free trade agreements U.S. concepts of due process and safeguards against
arbitrary or discriminatory measures).
23. Compare Trade in Services and E-Commerce: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Energy
[19: 679
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occasionally unreasonable or arbitrary actions by governments, but,
in most cases, if there is no significant violation of due process, we
would not immediately think that an international law norm had been
breached.
Nevertheless, NAFTA was a brave new world for the three
governments. As one senior U.S. government official has
commented:
The United States, and for that matter Canada and Mexico, took a very
big step into the unknown when they signed on to Chapter 11. The
NAFTA Parties have waived sovereign immunity from claims to an
extent far greater than they have consented to the jurisdiction, for
example, of the International Court of Justice. They have agreed to be
answerable to private claimants before arbitral tribunals that are subject to
only very limited review. Even though the United States has been party to
a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling Chapter 11,
we have never done so with states that have so much investment in our
territory.24
The NAFTA investment protection provisions have produced a
significant volume of litigation in ten years. At least twelve Chapter
11 actions brought by foreign investors against NAFTA host
governments have resulted in decisions on the merits or other
dispositive, or partially dispositive, opinions, and another twenty or
so are in various stages of proceedings .2 A handful - Metalclad v.
and Commerce Comm., 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of David Waskow,
International Policy Analyst and Trade Policy Coordinator of Friends of the Earth)
(noting that only the most egregious and rare governmental action should amount
to expropriation under any free trade agreement), with Mark Friedman & Gaetan
Verhoosel, Arbitrating over BIT Claims; Under Bilateral Investment Treaties,
More Investors Are Taking Action against Foreign States, 26 NAT'L L.J. 15, 17
(2003) (encouraging international commercial entities to vigorously pursue
available investment dispute settlement mechanisms).
24. Mark Clodfelter, U.S. State Department Participation in International
Economic Dispute Resolution, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 1273, 1283 (2001).
25. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001) (ICSID (W.
Bank) Aug. 30, 2000); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347 (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. (Nov. 26, 2002)); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. (June 24, 1998)); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, 40
I.L.M. 56 (2001) (ICSID (W. Bank) June 2, 2000); Methanex Corp. v. United
States, (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Aug. 7, 2002)), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2003); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1484-85 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
United Mexican States, Loewen v. United States, Pope & Talbot v.
Canada, S.D. Myers v. Canada, and Methanex v. United States - are
generating considerable attention among the NAFTA member
governments, the foreign investment bar, and non-governmental
organizations that are concerned with environmental protection,
alleged erosion of national sovereignty or other problems, real or
imagined. These cases, in particular, have influenced U.S.
government views and are reflected in the revised investment
protection language found in the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA.
Only four cases - Metalclad, S.D. Myers, Pope & Talbot, and
Feldman v. United Mexican States - have resulted in monetary
damages awards against Canada or Mexico,26 and no monetary
damages have been awarded to date against the United States.
Another group of cases - Azinian v. United Mexican States, UPS v.
Canada, Mondev v. United States, ADF, and Loewen - has resulted
in dismissals of all allegations against the respondent governments.
(Nov. 13, 2000)); Azinian v. United Mexican States, 39 I.L.M. 537 (2000) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Nov. 1, 1999); Mondev v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Oct. 11, 2002); ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, (ICSID (W. Bank)
Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003); UPS v. Canada, (ICSID (W. Bank) Nov. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/Jurisdiction%20Award.22Nov02.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003);
Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003) (ICSID (W. Bank) Dec.
16, 2002); Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811 (ICSID (W. Bank)
June 26, 2003). Based on the best information available, approximately thirty-two
Chapter 11 actions have been filed, including those which may be dormant. See
NAFTALAW, The Disputes: Pleadings, Orders & Awards (providing a list of all
public NAFTA dispute cases), at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Mar. 21,
2004).
26. See Metalclad, 40 I.L.M. at 54 (ordering Mexico to pay Metalclad
$16,685,000); S.D. Myers, 40 I.L.M. at 1444 (holding that Canada must
compensate S.D. Myers); Pope & Talbot, 41 I.L.M. at 1362 (requiring Canada to
pay the investor $461,566, which includes both principal plus interest); Feldman,
42 I.L.M. at 669 (ordering Mexico to pay the claimant 9,464,627.50 Mexican
pesos, plus interest).
27. See Azinian, 391 I.L.M. at 556 (deciding in favor of Mexico); Mondev, 42
I.L.M. at 115 (dismissing the investor's claims); ADF Group, para. 194 (ICSID
(W. Bank) Jan. 9, 2003) (rejecting all claims); Loewen Group, 42 I.L.M. at 850
(finding that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissing the claims); UPS, para. 134
(ICSID (W. Bank) Nov. 22, 2003) (accepting Canada's principal jurisdictional
objection).
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Business interests wish to preserve the broad NAFTA protections,
no doubt in part because a weakening of the NAFTA language by
interpretation or subsequent agreement could have implications for
U.S. investor rights under the various bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") concluded by the United States during the past several
decades. However, environmental groups, among other members of
civil society, have sought exceptions to protect environmental and
health policies from challenge under Chapter 11.28
The three NAFTA governments have reacted, both to public
pressures and to their actual or anticipated losses in NAFTA
litigation, by seeking to narrow the scope of liability. The
governments have issued an "Interpretation" of Article 1105 of
NAFTA that essentially directs NAFTA arbitral panels to narrow the
scope of "fair and equitable treatment" to what customary
international law provides.2 9 The governments have also sought, with
mixed success, to narrow the definition of "investment" and
"investor," and to require a closer nexus between the governmental
action and the foreign investor.3 0 Furthermore, they have argued that
28. See Administration Works on Investment Position for Singapore FTA,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 15, 2000, at 2 (reporting that environmental groups
pushed for modifications to traditional investments provisions that do not make
exceptions for environmental and other health and safety policies).
29. See NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF
CERTAIN CHAPTER 11 PROVISIONS 2 (2001) (clarifying that Article 1105 embodies
the customary international law standard for determining possible violations of
"fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security"), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/July%2031 %202001%20NAFTA%20FTC%2
OStatement.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION].
30. See David A. Gantz, Potential' Conflicts Between Investor Rights and
Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 651, 671-74 (2001) (noting that the initial action against the United States in
Methanex was dismissed in August 2002 by the tribunal on the grounds that the
California action of banning the gasoline additive MTBE was not a measure
relating to Methanex). The tribunal "decide[d] that the phrase 'relating to' in
Article 1101(1) NAFTA signifies something more than the mere effect of a
measure on an investor or an investment and that it requires a legally significant
connection between them, as the USA contends." Methanex Corp. v. United States,
para. 147 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Aug. 7, 2002)), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2003) A second amended complaint was subsequently filed and that proceeding is
pending before a NAFTA tribunal. See NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal: Methanex
Corporation v. United States (Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction), (August 7,
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
NAFTA's expropriation provisions should not be applied in "partial
taking" situations, such as when reasonable government regulation,
including environmental regulation, has the effect of reducing the
value of a foreign investor's property interests." Environmental
groups have been particularly critical of Chapter 11, arguing, not
always accurately, that investor protection provisions have been used
repeatedly to challenge the host country's environmental laws and
administrative decisions.32  The U.S. Congress, reflecting the
concerns of a number of members, and reacting in part to public
pressure,33 enacted TPA legislation as requested by President Bush.
In the process, Congress, with the ultimate concurrence of the
President, effectively directed that the investment protection
provisions of future trade agreements negotiated under TPA,
including those under negotiation with Chile and Singapore, comply
with certain stated objectives.34
At first glance, fixing some of NAFTA's perceived problems in
new agreements does not seem particularly difficult, assuming the
governments that are parties to the new trade agreements are willing
to concur; however, the NAFTA governments are in a "Catch-22"
2002), INT'L LAW IN BRIEF, Feb. 14, 2003 (noting that the Tribunal found that
Methanex must file related evidentiary materials, as well as an amended pleading
before it would make a "definitive ruling on jurisdiction"), at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib06O3.htm#J3 (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
31. See infra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing the tribunals'
dealings with partial takings).
32. See, e.g., Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Chapter 11 Provisions Said to Threaten
Environmental Protection Rights, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1146 (1999) (quoting a
report issued by the International Institute for Sustainable Development criticizing
the investor-state dispute provisions in Chapter 11).
33. See, e.g., Letter from Max Baucus, U.S. Senator, to Robert Zoellick, U.S.
Trade Representative (Mar. 26, 2002) (arguing that TPA objectives must be
investment agreements that balance protection of U.S. investors abroad with
preserving the regulatory authority of U.S. governmental entities),
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply-nl txt.asp?f=wto200 1.ask&dh=7417773
4&q=baucus (last visited Feb. 14, 2004); Press Release, Sierra Club, Oppose H.R.
3005, the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 (Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Sierra Club] (voicing opposition to House legislation including language allowing
investment provisions similar to NAFTA Chapter 11 in future trade agreements),
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/12groups.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
34. See 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002) (setting forth specific trade negotiating
objectives for foreign investment).
[19: 679
2004] THE EVOLUTION OF FTA INVESTMENT PRO VISIONS
situation. Narrowing the scope of the investment protection
provisions in NAFTA or in future agreements may relieve the United
States, Canada, and Mexico from liability when they are respondents
under those provisions.35 Too much success in this endeavor,
however, could jeopardize the NAFTA governments' protections
provided to U.S., Canadian, and European foreign investors under
the hundreds of BITs negotiated during the past twenty-five years.36
Given the common practice of both private investors and
governments in citing prior investment tribunal decisions that appear
to favor them, it is inevitable that ICSID and other tribunals
interpreting similar provisions of these BITs will consider and
sometimes follow the NAFTA cases. Thus, a victory by the United
States or Canada in narrowing these protections in a particular
NAFTA proceeding may well be a defeat for their own foreign
investors in other cases. This possibility could seriously undermine
the BIT program and more than half a century of efforts to protect
U.S. and Canadian investors abroad.
It is also possible that some tribunals will rely upon of the
language of the new agreements concluded subsequently to NAFTA,
particularly annexes or side letters that are to be used to interpret
provisions in the new agreements that are similar to those in
NAFTA,37 as an aid to interpreting the Chapter 11 mechanism. Nor is
it clear whether the creative and fertile legal minds that have
generated so much litigation under NAFTA Chapter 11, particularly
between Canadian investors and the United States, and vice versa,
will apply their efforts to cases involving the United States, Chile,
Singapore, and many other nations whose FTAs and BITs with the
United States contain the new language. In fairness, occasional rather
outrageous actions against the interests of foreign investors by the
35. See Courtney C. Kirkman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v.
United States and the Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 343, 392 (2002) (arguing that interpreting the NAFTA "fair and
equitable treatment" requirement too broadly risks legitimate state regulatory
efforts).
36. See id. (asserting that a "balance must be struck" between investor
protection and respect for state regulatory measures).
37. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annexes 10A, 1OD; Singapore FTA, supra
note 1, side letters of May 6, 2003 (specifying the parties' common interpretation
of certain provisions).
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NAFTA governments or certain of their states or provinces from
time to time, have also encouraged increased use of Chapter 11.
While negotiating the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA, the U.S.
government is, or was, the Respondent in nine proceedings brought
under Chapter 11, one of the most significant of which, Methanex,
remains pending. Three others, ADF Group Inc., Mondev, and
Loewen were pending during most of the period in which the Chile
and Singapore negotiations took place, even though they are now
resolved. Thus, these agreements present significant ways of
assessing the evolution of U.S. government thinking on how to
achieve an appropriate balance between investor protection and other
valid government regulation, and other aspects of the evolving U.S.
views. This is true even though it may be several years or more
before there is an investment dispute brought under the provisions of
these two agreements. While the Singapore and Chile investment
provisions are applicable to investments existing at the time the FTA
enters into force, like NAFTA, they apply only to government
actions that take place after the FTA entered into force.
38
The changes, however, are by no means limited to Chile and
Singapore. Since December 2003, the United States has concluded
free trade agreements containing similar language with the nations of
Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica), the Dominican Republic, and Morocco.39 Others are
38. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.1; Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art.
15.1 (explaining that the scope of the agreements does not extend to investments
that ended before the agreement entered into force). A NAFTA Tribunal has
confirmed that Chapter 11 applies only to government actions or omissions after
January 1, 1994. See Feldman v. United Mexican States, Interim Decision on
Preliminary Issues, 40 I.L.M. 615, 623 (ICSID (W. Bank) Dec. 6, 2000) (noting,
however, that a "permanent course of action by Respondent which started before
January 1, 1994 and went on after that date.., is subject to the Tribunal's
Jurisdiction").
39. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. & Central
American Countries Conclude Historic Fee Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 2003)
(announcing the creation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement between
the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/12/03-82.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and Costa Rica Reach
Agreement on Free Trade (Jan. 25, 2004) (addressing the conclusion of
negotiations for Costa Rica to join CAFTA), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/01/04-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); Press
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underway or planned with Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Panama
in this hemisphere, and with Bahrain, Thailand, and the nations of
the South African Customs Union, and perhaps others. 40
Also, in February 2004, the State Department finally promulgated
the 2004 Update of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty ("2004
Model BIT") (in draft), which is designed to replace the Model BIT
of 1994 and "provide a consistent approach between the investment
chapters of U.S. free trade agreements and future BITs."' Thus, the
changes embodied for the first time in the Chile and Singapore FTAs
could, within a few years, govern the investment relations between
the United States and numerous other nations. These new FTAs and
BITs are all, or virtually all, with capital importing developing
countries, so that the likelihood of their investors suing the United
States is quite low.
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and Morocco Conclude
Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 2, 2004) (discussing the role of a U.S.-Morocco FTA
in leading the way for a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/03/04-15.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. & Dominican Republic
Conclude Talks Integrating the Dominican Republic into the Central American
Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 15, 2004) (publicizing the addition of the Dominican
Republic to CAFTA), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/03/04-19.pdf
(last visited Apr. 23, 2004).
40. See Status of U.S. Trade Agreement Negotiations, 21 INT'L TRADE REP.
168 (2004) (listing the current and planned trade negotiations and the next steps in
the processes), http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/ITR.NSF/f6e265388fc7082185256b
57005bfe23/6629884d0c5dldb685256e22007a91fl?OpenDocument (last visited
Apr. 24, 2004). The recent FTA with Australia is the only one concluded in recent
years that departs significantly from the Chile FTA model, in that the Australia
FTA does not include binding international arbitration for investor - host state
disputes, although it includes most of the new language relating to customary
international law and to regulatory takings. See Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, U.S. and Australia Complete Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 8,
2004) (announcing the finalization of the U.S.-Australia Free FTA), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/02/04-08.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).
41. See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Update of U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaty ("BIT") (Feb. 5, 2004) (linking to updated draft language of the
U.S. BIT), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/prsrl/28923.htm (last visited Apr. 23,
2004). The model BIT technically remains under revision, a process which has
been going on for several years. See Telephone Interview with David Weiner, Esq.,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Apr. 25, 2003) (remarking that no
additional BITs will be negotiated by the United States until the new model BIT
language has been cleared through the interagency process).
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Part I of this article briefly reviews the genesis of NAFTA Chapter
11, and focuses on the fruits of the BIT program that have resulted in
more than forty treaties between the United States and various
developing countries since 1980.42 Part II discusses the investment
protection provisions of NAFTA with emphasis on those provisions
that have proven to be most difficult for NAFTA arbitrators to apply
and interpret: Article 1105, the "Minimum Standard of Treatment,"
and Article 1110, "Expropriation." Part III discusses the investment
objectives of the TPA that reflect broader congressional and public
concerns over certain aspects of NAFTA.
With this background, Parts IV and V analyze the NAFTA
language and parallel articles in the Chile FTA, and focus on the two
substantive areas in which there have been the most significant
changes: fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. In the
context of Article 1105 and fair and equitable treatment, Parts IV and
V also discuss the important issue of mandatory interpretations of
NAFTA and the other agreements. The NAFTA governments have
sought to defend against application of these concepts to themselves,
through an official "Interpretation" under Article 1131(2) and their
expressed views on the proper scope and application of these
provisions.43 Notwithstanding NAFTA's directive that a tribunal
under Chapter 11 shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance
with the agreement and with applicable rules of international law,
there has been, and continues to be, considerable disagreement over
the meaning of the phrase "international law" as it applies to such
concepts as "fair and equitable treatment" and "indirect
expropriation," as discussed in detail in Parts IV and V of this article.
42. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Comments on Their Origin, Purposes and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAW 105 (1986) (asserting that the principal purpose of the BIT
program was to provide a mechanism for protecting U.S. investments in third
world countries from unfair treatment and discrimination); see also U.S. Dept. of
State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program [hereinafter U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaty Program] (providing a list of all of the countries that have BITs
with the United States), at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2004).
43. See id. art. 1131(2) (explaining that an interpretation by the Commission of
a provision of NAFTA shall be binding on a tribunal established under Chapter
11).
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In each instance, the article focuses first on the case law, the TPA
and other relevant factors, and then discusses the Chile FTA changes
in language. The article also discusses briefly, in Part IV, the
investment provisions of the FTAA, and the investment provisions of
the Canada-Chile FTA of 1996. However, this is not intended to be a
comprehensive analysis of all of the respective investment provisions
of NAFTA and the two newer FTAs.
Part VI briefly discusses some of the other significant changes in
the Chile FTA language compared to NAFTA, particularly in areas
related to transparency. Finally, Part VII speculates on the extent to
which the changes as reflected in the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA
might affect the results in any foreign investment disputes to which
they may apply.
I. THE GENESIS OF NAFTA, CHAPTER 11
The investment provisions of NAFTA are evolutionary rather than
revolutionary. Most of the key language regarding the definition of
investment and investors,44 national treatment,45 fair and equitable
treatment,46  expropriation,47  and the requirement for binding
international arbitration of investment disputes, 8 is based generally
on the more than forty U.S. BITs concluded beginning in the early
1980s, 49 the investment provisions of the U.S.-Canada FTA ("Canada
FTA"),50 or both. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the U.S. BIT
44. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
45. Id. art. 1102.
46. Id. art. 1105.
47. Id. art. 1110.
48. Id. ch. 11.
49. See U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, supra note 42 (describing
the framework of the U.S. Bilateral Treaty Program). BITs include a commitment
to treat investments of other parties as favorably as it treats domestic investments,
creates limits on the expropriation of investments, and gives U.S. investors the
right to submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner's government to
international arbitration. Id.
50. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Canada FTA] (stating as objectives
the elimination of barriers to trade, facilitation of conditions of fair competition
within the free trade area, and significantly liberalizing the conditions for
investment within the free trade area).
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program is that prior to the Canada FTA and NAFTA, all of the BITs
entered into by the United States were with developing countries,
and the Canada FTA incorporated neither the "fair and equitable"
treatment language nor binding international arbitration. The only
significant post-NAFTA departure from that developing country
oriented practice to date has been in the inclusion of investment
provisions in the FTA with Singapore, a nation that by most
statistical measures is generally at the same level of development as
Canada.5 The recently concluded U.S. - Australia FTA is consistent
with this practice, in that while it contains a list of investor rights,
there are no provisions providing for arbitration of investor-state
disputes.52
This issue is important because the BITs, like Chapter 1 1 of
NAFTA, Chapter 15 of the Singapore FTA, and Chapter 10 of the
Chile FTA, are all fully reciprocal with regard to the basic
obligations. 53 However, it has been quite obvious from the outset of
the BIT program through today that the principal purpose of these
provisions was to protect U.S. investment in foreign countries. 54 The
51.The countries are quite similar in terms of literacy rates (Canada, 99%;
Singapore, 93%), life expectancy(Canada, 77 years male, 82 years, female;
Singapore, 77 years male, 81 years, female) and per capita gross domestic product
(Canada, $3,423, Singapore, $21,255). See U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note:
Singapore, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2004); U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Canada, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
52. See U.S. - Australia Free Trade Agreement (unsigned), Arts. 11.3-11.10
(containing a usual list of investor protections, but no obligation to arbitrate),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Australia/text/text 11.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2004). Apparently, the omission of binding arbitration was at the request of
Australia, not the United States. See U.S., Australia FTA Falls Short on U.S.
Investment Demands, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 13, 2004, at 1 ("The free-trade
agreement reached by the U.S. and Australia... fails to provide U.S. investors
with the same legal protections contained in previous trade deals completed by the
Bush Administration.").
53. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11; Chile FTA, "supra note 1, ch. 10;
Singapore FTA, supra note 1, ch. 15 (illustrating that all investment provisions
apply equally to the other party or parties). In NAFTA, as in all subsequent FTA
investment chapters, there are extensive country-specific reservations to national
treatment and other obligations. See, e.g., NAFTA Annexes I, II, and IV.
54. See Gudgeon, supra note 42, at 105 (observing that the BIT program had
the additional goal of encouraging investment treatment consistent with U.S. and
international standards).
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U.S. government created the BIT program to protect U.S. foreign
investment and to encourage standards compatible with U.S. policies
and international law.55 The U.S. State Department's current official
guidance on BITs confirms that the BIT program's objectives are to
protect U.S. investment abroad, encourage market-oriented domestic
policies, and support international legal standards. 6
By providing a dispute settlement mechanism allowing U.S.
companies to seek arbitration of investment disputes by an
independent body outside of Mexico, NAFTA did not depart
significantly from the BITs. As the Statement of Administrative
Action observed, "NAFTA provides a historic investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism, so that individual U.S. companies no longer
face an unbalanced environment in an investment dispute with the
Mexican government but can seek arbitration outside Mexico by an
independent body."57 There is no mention in either the BIT or the
NAFTA context of providing foreign investors in the United States
with a superior level or protection for their investments, even though
all of the BITs, as well as NAFTA, are reciprocal, and the United
States has been the respondent in at least eight actions brought under
Chapter 11.58
Today, Canada and Singapore are the exceptions, the only
developed countries that have entered into full investment protection
agreements with the United States.5 9 Having BIT-type provisions in
the Chile FTA are the norm, given the fact that Chile is still
55. Seeid.atlll.
56. See U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, supra note 42 (emphasizing
the United States' interest in having foreign countries adopt liberal policies on the
treatment of foreign investment and the U.S. government's support of regional
initiatives on investment liberalization).
57. North American Free Trade Agreement, Text of Agreement, Implementing
Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting Statements,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 685 (1993).
58. See The Disputes: Pleadings, Orders & Awards, supra note 25 (listing
several disputes brought against the United States government under Chapter 11).
These include disputes brought forth by Loewen, Methanex, Mondev, Tembec
Corp., Kennex, Dorman, Canfor, Corp., and ADF Group. Id.
59. See U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, supra note 42.
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considered a developing country by most indicators.6 ° Of course, a
few years ago, the United States came close to having BIT-type
language applicable to disputes among all major developed countries
through the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI").61
Although never ratified or concluded, the MAI would have required
that similar investment protection rules apply not only to Canada, but
to all other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD").62 The negotiations for this agreement
failed in large part because of some of the same concerns that are
now being raised with regard to Chapter 11.63 Those U.S. and
Canadian government officials who are currently concerned that
Chapter 11 provides excessively broad protection to foreign investors
could have faced the nightmare prospect of dealing with numerous
investment claims, not only between the United States and Canada,
but relating to the billions of dollars of North American, European,
and Japanese investment in each others' nations.64
The focus on developing countries helps to explain the breadth of
NAFTA Chapter 11 concepts, such as the definition of "investment"
and the use of the somewhat vague concepts of "fair and equitable
60. See U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Chile (indicating that Chile is
relatively highly-developed with regard to literacy (95.8%) and life expectancy
(76-79 years overall), but Chile's per capita GDP is only $4,200), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1981 .htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
61. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Documentation from the Negotiations:
Introduction (providing documentation from the MAI negotiations launched in
1995), at http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
62. See id. (explaining that the objective of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment ("MAI") was to provide a broad, multilateral framework for
investment, open to all OECD members); see also Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, About OECD (listing the current thirty member
countries in the OECD), at
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_18894021_1-1-1 ,00
.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
63. See Gantz, supra note 30, at 653.
64. See United Nations Commission on Trade and Economic Development,
Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise, Foreign Direct Investment
Statistics (finding that about $1200 billion in foreign direct investment flowed into
developed countries in 2000, while only $200 billion flowed into developing
countries), at http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats files/fdistats.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004).
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treatment" and "tantamount to expropriation. '65 Such language
reflects U.S. and investor distrust of the legal systems of developing
countries after many decades of expropriation disputes, and a belief
that governments and courts in many developing countries do not
provide the basic guarantees that citizens and businesses of highly
developed countries take for granted.66
During the NAFTA negotiations, relatively little thought was
given to how BIT-type provisions would affect investor-state
relations between Canada and the United States, the two developed
countries involved in the agreement. Their well-developed legal
systems with independent judiciaries provide a relatively high level
of protection for investors, whether foreign or domestic, against
arbitrary actions by the governments, legislatures, and courts.6 7
Moreover, the trade and bilateral investment relationship between
Canada and the United States is one of the most extensive in the
world, with more than $1.4 billion of trade per day between the two
nations. 68 In addition, the United States is Canada's largest investor
at $142.8 billion, while the $92 billion Canada invests in the United
States ranks third.69 With large cadres of well-educated, aggressive,
and creative attorneys, regulatory actions that may be motivated by
environmental concerns or protectionist pressures, and legislatures
and courts that may take actions that are arbitrary, discriminatory,
and unreasonable, it is perhaps not surprising that roughly sixty
percent of the NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute filings to date have been
65. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1105, 1110.
66. See Gantz, supra note 30, at 678-79 (contending that frequently, under
international law, a nation is forced to accord aliens broader and more liberal
treatment than it accords its own citizens due to differences in the country's basic
guarantees). These guarantees include procedural and substantive due process, and
courts that are independent of the executive branch and free from corruption. Id.
67. See Background Note: Canada, supra note 51 (confirming that Canada's
legal system consists of a judicial branch that is separate from the executive and
the legislative branches).
68. See id. (noting the staggering volume of trade between the United States
and Canada). The vast activities in which the two countries participate, including
law enforcement cooperation, environmental cooperation, and free trade, have set
the standard by which many other countries measure their own progress. Id.
69. Id.
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by U.S. investors against Canada, or Canadian investors against the
United States. y°
II. NAFTA'S PROTECTIONS FOR FOREIGN
INVESTORS
NAFTA is an international agreement that requires its parties to
"interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement in light of its
objectives.., and in accordance with applicable rules of
international law. 71 In addition, tribunals convened under Chapter
11 are directed "to decide disputed issues in accordance with both
NAFTA this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.
7 y2
There is no provision in Chapter 1 1 suggesting that the national laws
of NAFTA parties are to be applied, and in practice, NAFTA
tribunals have analyzed and interpreted national laws and domestic
cases only when such analysis was germane to determining whether
one of the Parties violated applicable rules of NAFTA or
international law. 3
Several jurisdiction and process issues have also become
significant under NAFTA. First, the coverage of Chapter 1 1 is
limited in that it only applies to measures that relate to an investor or
70. See The Disputes: Pleadings, Orders & Awards, supra note 25 (indicating
that, of thirty-two dispute filings, fourteen have been against Mexico, nine against
Canada, and nine against the United States).
71. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(2).
72. Id. art. 1131(1).
73. See, e.g., Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Dec. 16, 2002) (discussing a claim brought by U.S. national against the
Mexican government under NAFTA's provisions concerning the taxation of the
export of cigarettes). Mexican courts were reviewing certain matters solely under
Mexican law which at the same time were also under review before the tribunal, in
the latter instance with regard to their consistency or inconsistency with NAFTA
requirements. Id. at 637-38. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
requires that international agreements "be interpreted in good faith and in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 25 I.L.M. 543,
562. Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, parties can refer to
supplementary means of interpretation, when interpretation "leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable." Id. art. 32.
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investment of another Party.74 It is unclear how significant the
connection between the government action and the investor must be.
However, because the Free Trade Commission ("Commission") may
make binding determinations as to how NAFTA tribunals interpret
Chapter 11 provisions, the meaning of Chapter 11 is, at least to some
degree, dynamic.75 However, only one such "interpretation" has been
issued by the NAFTA parties to date, and it immediately sparked
controversy because of charges that the action was an attempt not to
interpret, but to amend, the treaty.76
Of course, the interpretation approach will only work if the
NAFTA Parties first agree to make an interpretation and then agree
as to what the interpretation should say. Drafting and issuing an
interpretation is difficult both politically and legally, and it is
unlikely that all interested parties, including government officials,
Congress, the business community, environmental and other groups
will ever be fully satisfied. Moreover, as one Canadian official has
noted, "the clarification process is not a means of changing the
obligations of the agreement, but is rather a reaffirmation of the
objective of specific provisions and reflects the intent of the parties
to the Agreement. It is not a vehicle to change obligations of the
agreement. '77 Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether a tribunal
could determine that a directive from the Free Trade Commission is
ultra vires, whether interpretations are retroactive and apply to
74. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101 (setting forth the somewhat ambiguous
concept that any measures complained of under NAFTA must "relate to" an
investor or investment of another party).
75. See id. art. 2001(1) (establishing that the Free Trade Commission is
comprised of one cabinet-level representative from each country).
76. See INTERPRETATION, supra note 29. This interpretation was extensively
criticized in Pope & Talbot, where the tribunal suggested that the interpretation
was a disguised amendment. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347,
1356 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Nov. 26, 2002)) (indicating that the tribunal would have
concluded that the action was an amendment if it were required to do so to decide
the case, but such a determination was not required).
77. Stephen Brereton, Investor Protection in the NAFTA and Beyond: Private
Interest and Public Purposes, Remarks at the University of Toronto Center for
International Studies 13 (May 3, 2002) (on file with author). Mr. Brereton is the
Director of the Investment Trade Policy Division of the Canadian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Id.
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presently pending cases, and whether interpretations apply to future
cases that have yet to be filed.
Also, the customary international rules on treaty interpretation,
which provide for treaties to be interpreted in good faith and in light
of the treaty's object and purpose may affect the "interpretation" by a
tribunal.78 Additionally, these rules recognize that parties attempting
to interpret treaty provisions may look to the preamble, text, annexes,
agreements in connection with the treaty's conclusion, and "any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.
' 79
Thus, both the agreed terms and interpretations are likely to affect
arbitrators' efforts to interpret and apply Chapter 11.
Although Chapter 11 contains provisions relating to most-favored-
nation treatment, performance requirements, nationality of senior
management, and financial transfers, the most important and
controversial provisions relate to national treatment, free and
equitable treatment, protection against expropriation, and binding
investor-host arbitration. 8°  Thus, the national treatment/non-
discrimination provision-Article 1102(1)-requires that each
NAFTA "Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment
no less favorable that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors, with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments."'"
The obligation applies to states and provinces, as well as to the
federal governments, and to investors-the companies and firms-
not just to the investment.82 There are a variety of exceptions,
78. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 73, and
discussion therein.
79. Id. art. 31(3)(a).
80. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1102-03, 1105-07, 1109-10.
81. Id. art. 1102(1). As between national treatment and most-favored nation
treatment, the investor and investment receive the more favorable of the two. Id.,
art. 1104.
82. See id. art. 1102(3) (extending the national treatment requirement to sub-
national states and provinces of the parties).
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principally those found in Annex IV,83 but also many listed in
Annexes I and 11.84 The essence of a national treatment obligation is
that a host government must treat foreign investors in the same
manner as its own national investors." However, in some instances,
the treatment afforded, both to domestic investors and to foreigners,
is seriously deficient, especially with regard to national
administrative actions, police protection, or access to courts.86 As a
result, NAFTA, in language similar, but not identical, to that found
in most of the U.S. BITs, imposed certain minimum standards. "Each
Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security."87
As the title to Article 1105 suggests, there is a "minimum standard
of treatment" for foreign investors.88 By connecting the "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" concepts with
"international law" in Article 1105, the drafters presumably intended
that those asserting a denial of fair and equitable treatment would
have to demonstrate that the denial was a violation of international
law.89 There is no general requirement of a denial of justice, such as
evidence of gross misconduct on the part of a state or its institutions
83. See id. Annex IV (articulating exceptions to the most favored treatment
provisions laid out in art. 1102(3)).
84. See id. Annexes I, II (incorporating various reservations which provide
more favorable treatment for nationals than for foreigners). These annexes are
titled "Reservations for Existing Measures" and "Reservations for Future
Measures," respectively. Id.
85. See id. art. 1102 (requiring equal treatment for foreign and domestic
investors, investments, and states or provinces).
86. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36, 50 (ICSLD (W. Bank)
Aug. 30, 2000 (finding a denial of fair and equitable treatment under art. 1105
without any determination of discrimination between claimant and Mexican
nationals under article 1102).
87. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(l).
88. Id. art. 1105.
89. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in
165 THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 174 (Judith H. Bello
et al., eds. 1994) (commenting on NAFTA's incorporation of customary
international law principles in Article 1105).
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that goes beyond an erroneous or even unjust administrative
decision, as a condition of bringing a claim under Chapter 11.90
However, one NAFTA tribunal has opined that, despite the absence
of an exhaustion of remedies requirement in NAFTA, no violation of
"fair and equitable treatment" based on a denial of justice by a court
can occur under NAFTA or under customary international law unless
there has been an exhaustion of local legal remedies or a showing
that such exhaustion would have been fruitless. 9'
However, the precise meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" is
never articulated in NAFTA itself. Article 1105 is not mentioned in
the U.S. Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the
agreement to Congress in 1993, and is mentioned only in passing in
what is probably the most authoritative contemporary analysis of
Chapter 11.92 Only the Canadian Statement on Implementation of
NAFTA explained that Article 1105(1) "provides for a minimum
absolute standard of treatment, based on long-standing principles of
customary international law." 93
In the past, national treatment and fair and equitable treatment
have not been the most important protections for foreign investors.
Rather, the focus had been on protection against nationalization or
expropriation. However, situations in which a host country's police
force or army marches into a foreign-owned factory or mine and
90. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121. (requiring only that the investor
surrender the right to initiate or continue national court proceedings and to agree to
be bound by the arbitration).
91. See discussion infra Part IV (relating the Loewen tribunal's refusal to find a
denial of justice where there had been no appeal from a Mississippi trial court
either to higher courts in Mississippi or to the U.S. Supreme Court).
92. See Price & Christy, supra note 89, at 174 (mentioning "fair and equitable
treatment" in the limited context of a discussion of customary international law).
93. Dep't of External Affairs, North American Free Trade Agreement:
Canadian Statement on Implementation, CANADA GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1994, at 149;
see also NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, CLARIFICATIONS RELATED TO
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 (July 31, 2001) (declaring seven years later that concepts of
"fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require
national measures to go beyond what is required by customary international law),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta-chapterl 1.PDF (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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seizes it are relatively rare today, even in developing countries.9 4
Accordingly, the nationalization and expropriation provisions in
NAFTA afford coverage for indirect or "creeping" expropriation:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6.9'
While this NAFTA language is slightly more explicit than the
language in some earlier versions, the "tantamount to
nationalization" and other clauses similar to NAFTA Article 1110
are also found in the U.S.-Argentine Foreign Investment Treaty of
1991, the Canada FTA, and the 1994 U.S. model BIT. 96
94. See David A. Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation
and Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 476 (1977)
(discussing the Velasco government's abrupt expropriation of the multinational
Marcona Mining Company).
95. NAFTA, art. 1110(1) (emphasis added). NAFTA provides for
compensation "equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place.., that compensation be paid
without delay and be fully realizable," that compensation include interest in a hard
currency, and that compensation be freely transferable. Id. art. 1110(2)-(6).
96. See Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. IV(I), S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-2 (stating that measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization are
not allowed unless for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and in accordance with
due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 11(2)
of the treaty), http://170.110.214.18/tcc/data/commercehtml/TCCDocuments
/Argentinalnvestment.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2004); see also Canada FTA,
supra note 50, art. 1605 (recognizing indirect expropriation and measures
tantamount to an expropriation); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, The 1994 U.S.
Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. III [hereinafter 1994 U.S. Model BIT]
(restricting expropriation or nationalization through direct or indirect means),
http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/modelbit.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
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The similarities in these clauses reflect a relatively settled view of
customary international law on expropriation, at least among the
United States and other capital exporting countries. 97 However, even
under relatively well-recognized customary international law
principles, it is by no means clear when governmental action that
interferes with broadly defined property rights constitutes an illegal,
compensable taking.98 In determining whether a compensable
expropriation occurred or whether a government has simply
exercised its right as a sovereign to regulate, Chapter 11 tribunals
rely upon such key terms as "unreasonably interferes with," "unduly
delays," and "bona fide" from the Restatement and the "customary
international law" or "tantamount to expropriation" from NAFTA
Article 1110. Therefore these tribunals do, and likely will continue
to, analyze and apply Article 11 10 on a case-by-case basis. One can
reasonably expect tribunals appointed under the Chile, Singapore and
the growing number of future FTAs and BITs with similar language
to do the same.
III. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND
RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
No sensible foreign government is willing to complete substantive
trade negotiations with the United States in the absence of "fast-
track" legislation, now TPA.99 With TPA, Congress has limited its
authority so that it may only vote yes or no on a trade agreement, and
97. See Gudgeon, supra note 42, at 105 (commenting on the creation of BITs
as tools for protecting U.S. foreign investors in accordance with U.S. policies and
international law); see also President Ronald Reagan, Statement on International
Investment Policy (Sept. 9, 1983), reprinted in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN 1983, at 1246-47 (1985)
(indicating that the United States "places high priority" on protecting U.S.
investment from treatment inconsistent with international law).
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 712 cmt. g (1987) (stating that a state is responsible for
expropriation for action that prevents or unreasonably interferes with the effective
enjoyment of property, and that a state is not responsible for actions commonly
accepted as within the police power of states).
99. See Council of the Americas, What is Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)?
(noting that TPA sets U.S. negotiating objectives and establishes a "fast track"
timetable for the ratification of agreements), at http://www.americas-
society.org/coa/advocacy/tpa.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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cannot amend any provisions. °° In the absence of TPA, Congress has
the ability to amend the provisions of a trade agreement submitted
for approval so as to make them more attractive to Congress and less
attractive to the foreign government.101 Since 1974, with few
exceptions other than the period mid-1994 to 2002, Congress has
provided presidents with trade negotiating authority in realization of
the importance of trade to national security and economic growth.1
0 2
The Trade Act of 2002's "Trade Negotiation Objectives" serve to
guide U.S. trade policy, and were applicable to trade agreements
negotiated after August 6, 2002, which included the then ongoing
Chile, Singapore, FTAA, and WTO negotiations.0 3 These objectives
reflect an effort to reach a compromise between two conflicting
goals:
The negotiating objective on foreign investment reflects the [Senate
Finance] Committee's view that it is a priority for negotiators to seek
agreements protection the rights of U.S. investors abroad and ensuring the
existence of an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. It also
reflects the view that in entering into investment agreements, negotiators
must seek to protect the interests of the United States as a potential
defendant in investor-state dispute settlement. In other words, there ought
to be a balance. Protecting the rights of U.S. investors abroad should not
come at the expense of making Federal, State and local laws and
regulations unduly vulnerable to challenges by foreign investors.
1
0°4
The Senate Report also urged that future investment agreements
not "confer on foreign investors in the United States a right to
100. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(2) (2002).
101. See Leslie Alan Glick, World Trade After September 11, 2001: The U.S.
Response, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 637 (2002) (discussing Congress'
opposition, on constitutional and other grounds, to TPA because of these
limitations on Congressional power).
102. See Trade Act of 2002, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-624, at 150 (2002),
reprinted in 2002 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 682 (noting that the expansion of
international trade is vital to U.S. world leadership).
103. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002).
104. BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2002, S. REP. No.
107-139, at 13 (2d Sess. 2002).
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compensation for expropriation that differs substantially from the
right to compensation for takings that U.S. citizens already enjoy."105
This language reflects congressional and constituent uneasiness
regarding the NAFTA mechanism, and the likelihood that NAFTA
could permit arbitration tribunals to make major public policy
decisions with input only from the claimant and the NAFTA
governments. While business groups had urged the Bush
administration during the TPA debate not to "weaken the high
standards of protection for investment guaranteed in NAFTA
Chapter 11 and in our bilateral investment treaties,"'' 6 environmental
groups had just as strongly urged the Administration to reject future
provisions similar to those in NAFTA. 10 7 The state attorneys' general
took a similar position in favor of limiting the scope of investor
protections. 08
The resulting negotiating authority text reflected, inter alia, these
concerns and compromises:
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade- distorting
barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the
United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than United States investors in the United States,
and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that
would be available under United States legal principles and practice, by-
(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national
treatment:
105. Id. at 15.
106. Letter from the presidents of the U.S. Council for International Business,
the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the National Foreign Trade
Council and the National Association of Manufacturers, to Robert Zoellick, U.S.
Trade Representative (Aug, 30, 2001) [hereinafter Letter from the presidents] (on
file with author).
107. See Sierra Club, supra note 33, at 1 (imploring members of Congress not to
commit the United States to the equivalent of NAFTA Chapter 11 in subsequent
trade agreements).
108. See Letter from Bill Lockyer, California Attorney General on behalf of the
National Association of Attorneys General, to Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein,
U.S. Senators 1 (Apr. 3, 2002) (expressing concern "over the inclusion of
provisions in international trade agreements granting individual foreign investors
new rights to challenge and seek compensation for state, local or federal
government regulatory actions as 'expropriations"') (on file with author).
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(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation
for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and
practice;
(E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment
consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the
principle of due process .... 109
The objectives also incorporated a number of procedural and
transparency mechanisms, discussed in Part VI, infra.
The compromise that the TPA attempted to strike failed to fully
satisfy anyone. The TPA provisions have been criticized for
undermining U.S. legislation and failing to guarantee that foreign
investors will be barred from receiving protection not available to
U.S. firms. 110 Nevertheless, the investment provisions of the Chile
FTA, which obviously was designed in significant part to comply
with the TPA objectives, appear to have been satisfactory to
Congress, which noted that the Chile FTA "makes improvements to
the NAFTA investor-state dispute settlement model by providing
more transparency, public input into the dispute settlement,
mechanisms to improve the investor-state process by eliminating
frivolous claims, and a place marker for a future appellate body or
similar review mechanism.'' "
There is a particularly irony in the expressed desire of the
Congress to assure that foreign investors in the United States receive
no greater rights than those provided under U.S. domestic law. More
than thirty years ago, the United States and a handful of other capital
exporting nations opposed the adoption of the United Nations'
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States because of the
failure of the Charter to recognize any international law obligations.
The key aspect of the Charter, in addition to "permanent sovereignty
over natural resources," was the conditioning of the right of the host
state to expropriate foreign property only on the payment of
109. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
110. See Final Trade Package Further Weakens Limits on Investor Protections,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 2002, at 2 (documenting various interest groups'
opposition to the TPA).
111. House Report, supra note 3, at 3.
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appropriate compensation ... taking into account its [the host state's]
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances the state considers
pertinent... In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to
a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing state .... 112
While most would argue that U.S. takings law meets or exceeds
customary international law standards, and the new FTA/BIT
language contains many references to international law, this
language may come back to haunt the United States if and when
another waive of nationalization in developing countries occurs.
IV. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Despite the admonition that "[a]n award made by a Tribunal shall
have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in
respect of a particular case,"' 3 both parties before the tribunals, and
indeed the members of the tribunals themselves, routinely cite,
distinguish, agree with, or discount decisions of prior tribunals.'
4
While earlier decisions are clearly not binding precedent, everyone
involved considers them relevant in a manner similar to prior
decisions by the Appellate Body of the WTO. I5 Clearly, decisions of
arbitral tribunals are a source, albeit a subsidiary source, of
international. law under the Statute of the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ Statute"). 1 6 Most significantly, however, a majority of
the arbitrators appointed to NAFTA tribunals are likely to be
112. United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 2, 14
I.L.M. 254 (1975).
113. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(1).
114. See Joseph A. Strazzeri, Note, A Lucas Analysis of Regulatory
Expropriations Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 837,
846 (2002) (noting that the practice of arbitral tribunals has been to analyze prior
decisions and interpretations despite the strict absence of de jure stare decisis in
NAFTA jurisprudence).
115. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 845, 849 (1999) (arguing
that a de facto doctrine of stare decisis now exists in WTO jurisprudence).
116. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, 1058 (referring to "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as a "subsidiary means" of
determining applicable law).
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common law lawyers, and most common law lawyers are trained,
from their first days in law school, to look first at case law.
1 17
A. THE NAFTA CASE LAW PRIOR TO THE PARTIES'
INTERPRETATION EFFORTS
It is revealing, and becomes even clearer after reviewing the cases,
that a single sentence in NAFTA features "minimum standard of
treatment" and "fair and equitable treatment," while commensurate
provisions under Chapter 10 of the Chile FTA go on for several
paragraphs. In fact, the changes under the Chile FTA are attributable
in large measure to a series of NAFTA tribunal decisions, beginning
with Pope & Talbot, Metalclad, and S.D. Myers. The changes under
the Chile FTA also reflect several then-pending actions: Methanex,
Loewen Group, and a number of post "Interpretation" decisions
discussed in Part B.
The NAFTA Parties, particularly the United States and Canada,
were justifiably distressed by the Pope & Talbot Tribunal's
interpretation of the "fair and equitable treatment" language in
NAFTA Article 1105. That tribunal, considering claims that
Canada's implementation of the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement
with the United States violated NAFTA Article 1105, initially held
that the NAFTA right to "fair and equitable treatment" was in
addition to, rather than limited by, the phrase "treatment in
accordance with international law."
' 18
In concluding that the "additive" approach was appropriate, the
tribunal explicitly faulted the United States for failing to provide a
rationale as to the applicability for the "limiting" approach other than
117. See Jessica S. Wiltse, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BUFF. L.
REV. 1145, 1162-63 (2003) (noting that the simple fact that most of the arbitrators
and lawyers involved in panel proceedings come from a common law background
suggests that past decisions do, in fact, supply at least persuasive authority).
118. See Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, paras. 110-11
(NAFTA Arb. Trib (Apr. 10, 2001)) available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/AwardMerits-e.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). "Investors under
the NAFTA are entitled to the international law minimum, plus the fairness
elements." Id.
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the text of Article 1105."19 The tribunal also relied, erroneously, on
language in the standard BITs, notwithstanding the fact that Article
1105 of NAFTA significantly departed from the BIT language. 12
0
The tribunal also noted that the international law limitation would
permit foreign investors to be treated less favorably than national
investors, and that such treatment would be inconsistent with the
principle of national treatment. 121
In Metalclad, a case involving a dispute over the establishment of
a hazardous waste disposal facility, the tribunal ultimately found that
the Mexican government had violated NAFTA Article 1105 by
failing to provide a "transparent and predictable framework" for the
investor in the latter's efforts to comply with Mexican laws regarding
the placement of a hazardous waste disposal facility. 122 This finding
was problematic for the NAFTA governments because there is no
explicit obligation to provide transparency to investors under Section
A of Article 1105. The only NAFTA obligations with respect to
transparency, and they are general, are found in Chapter 18.123
In S.D. Myers, the tribunal found a violation of Article 1102's
national treatment requirement on the basis of blatant and publicly
documented discrimination between a hazardous waste processing
119. See id. para. 114 (criticizing the United States for supporting its Article
1105 argument by simple reference to the text of the article itself, and implicitly
rejecting the "when in doubt, read the statute" rule).
120. See id. at 52-54. As noted earlier, Article 1105 states that "[e]ach Party
shall accord to investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105. The Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
states that "[i]nvestment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment,
shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case by accorded treatment
less than that required by international law." 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 96.
Thus, under the then existing BIT language a colorable argument can be made that
the "fair and equitable treatment" obligation exists independently of the obligation
to comply with international law. Id.
121. Pope & Talbot, at 54 (noting also that such a limited interpretation of
Article 1105 would "run afoul" of Articles 1102 and 1103, which provide NAFTA
investors and investments national and most-favored-nation treatment).
122. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 50 (2001)
(ICSID (W. Bank) Aug. 30, 2000).
123. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 18 (requiring that each party publish "its
laws, regulations, procedures and... rulings" to any NAFTA measure to any
affected person or party).
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facility in Alberta, Canada and S.D. Myers' similar facility in
Ohio. 124 The tribunal's general view of Article 1105 was not
particularly radical and far more in accordance with the
Interpretation than with the Pope & Talbot Tribunal. The S.D. Myers
tribunal determined that "[a] breach of Article 1105 occurs only
when it is shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust
or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is
unacceptable from the international perspective." 125 The governments
were particularly concerned that the tribunal also found a violation of
Article 1105, largely on the basis of a finding of the Article 1102
violation. 2 6 The tribunal justified its conclusion in part by asserting
that the "minimum standard" was considered broader in scope than
the national treatment obligation.
1 27
As a State Department lawyer explained,
[a]lthough we do not take a position on the outcome of either [Metalclad
or S.D. Myers] ... both of these cases interpreted Article 1105's
minimum standard of treatment in a way we think is at odds with the
provision. In both cases, the tribunals looked beyond customary
international law for the content of the fair and equitable treatment
standard. 128
Several other early cases raising Article 1105 issues also likely
influenced the U.S. negotiators of the investment provisions of the
Chile FTA and Singapore FTA. In Loewen Group, a Mississippi state
court trial, alleged to have been conducted in an intentionally
prejudicial manner, resulted in a verdict against Loewen, a Canadian
operator of funeral homes, for approximately $100 million in actual
damages and $400 million in punitive damages, in a commercial
124. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1437 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
(Nov. 13, 2000).
125. Id. at 1438.
126. See id. ("[O]n the facts of this particular case the breach of Article 1102
essentially establishes a breach of Article 1105 as well.").
127. Id. The tribunal refused to rule out the possibility that there could be
circumstances in which a denial of national treatment "might not offend" the
minimum standard provisions. Id.
128. Clodfelter, supra note 24, at 1282.
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transaction worth less than $5 million. 12 9 Because the claimant
allegedly could not meet bonding requirements for an appeal, set at
$625 million, Loewen settled the case for $175 million, "under
conditions of extreme duress" and brought a Chapter 11 claim. 30
Loewen contended in part that the trial court's excessive judgment
and bonding requirements were violations of NAFTA, Article 1105,
and therefore Loewen was denied justice and denied fair and
equitable treatment by the Mississippi courts. 3 '
In partial response, the United States argued that the claimant
could not show the treatment accorded to Loewen by the courts of
Mississippi was "below the international minimum standard required
by Article 1105."132 The United States had contended that the fact
that "the Tribunal must consider the entirety of the U.S. system of
justice stems from the nature of the customary international law
obligation that gives rise to State responsibility for denial of
justice." '133 The form of the justice system is immaterial, and the
obligation is not to provide a court system that is free from error, but
only one that is "fundamentally adequate."'
' 34
The tribunal agreed that the Mississippi court decision was
"clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with
minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable
treatment."' 35 However, the tribunal agreed with the United States
that Loewen had failed to adequately pursue available domestic
remedies, preventing Loewen from prevailing on its denial of
justice/denial of fair and equitable treatment under international law
129. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 812 (ICSID (W.
Bank) June 26, 2003) (relating the facts of the case). Among other things, Loewen
alleged that the court permitted repeated appeals to the jury's anti-Canadian, racial,
and class biases. Id. at 817.
130. See id. at 812 (explaining that other options were "catastrophic or
unavailable").
131. See id. at 816 (setting out Loewen's claim against the United States).
132. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America at 4, Loewen Group,
Inc. v. United States, (ICSID (W. Bank) Mar. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7387.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2004).
133. Id. at 124.
134. Id. at 126-27.
135. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 833.
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claims.136 Other Article 1105 decisions are all post-Interpretation,
and are thus discussed in Part B, below.
B. THE "INTERPRETATION" AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NAFTA CASE
LAW
The Parties responded to their concerns in the then-pending Pope
& Talbot and Loewen, and the completed S.D. Myers and Metalclad
actions, by issuing their first, and to date, only "Interpretation" of
Chapter 11.137 The Interpretation of Article 1105(1) provided:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to
be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).138
Paragraph one confirms the Parties' view that "international law"
in Article 1105 means "customary international law." Paragraph two
was intended to effectively overrule Pope & Talbot, making it clear
that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security"
are afforded only to the extent required by customary international
136. See id. at 846 (highlighting Loewen's failure to pursue the U.S. Supreme
Court option). Arguably, this is all dicta, since the case was actually dismissed on
the ground that when Loewen's claims in the course of bankruptcy were assigned
to a Canadian corporation owned by a U.S. corporation, no jurisdiction over the
claim remained under Chapter 11. Id. at 850. A request for a supplemental decision
by the individual claimant, Robert Loewen, on his own behalf rather than on behalf
of the corporation, is pending. See Article 58 Submissions as to Raymond L.
Loewen's Article 116 Claim, Sep. 19, 2003, http://www.naftalaw.org (visited Apr.
26, 2004).
137. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2) (providing that "[a]n interpretation
by the [Free Trade] Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding
on a Tribunal established under this Section").
138. INTERPRETATION, supra note 29.
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law.13 9 Paragraph three sought to instruct tribunals tempted to follow
the S.D. Myers ruling that the claimant would have to establish
independently a violation of Article 1105, rather than piggybacking
on an Article 1102, national treatment violation, and to exclude
possible NAFTA tribunal jurisdiction over violations of separate
international agreements.14  This issue became important in
Methanex, as the focus of that case shifted toward discrimination
between domestic and foreign interests. In its amended statement of
claim, Methanex relied on S.D. Myers in arguing that establishment
of discrimination under Article 1102 essentially automatically met
the requirements of an Article 1105 violation as well.
141
However, the construction of international law in Article 1105(1)
as customary international law complicated the NAFTA Parties' (as
well as the tribunals') problems with Article 1105, even though the
governments likely understood customary international law to be the
meaning of international law. International law and customary
international law are not identical, although the differences may not
be as significant as the Parties suggested in their extensive pleadings.
International law presumably means the full range of sources in the
hierarchy set forth in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. 142
Thus, customary international law is indicated in Article 38(1)(b)
of the ICJ Statute as: "a usage felt by those who follow it to be an
obligatory one,"'' 43 or "a general and consistent practice of states that
139. See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text (discussing the Pope &
Talbot Tribunal's holding that the fair and equitable standard went beyond the
international law standard).
140. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text (reviewing the S.D. Myers
decision finding that an Article 1102 violation established a finding of an Article
1105 violation as well).
141. See Claimant Methanex Corporation's Second Amended Statement of
Claim, Methanex v. United States, paras. 313-15 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Nov. 5,
2002)) (characterizing the case as "raw economic protectionism"), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf
142. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 116, art. 38(1)
(listing the sources of international law as 1) international conventions; 2)
international custom; 3) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and 4) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists).
143. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60 (4th ed. 1949).
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they follow from a sense of legal obligation," 1" and is only a subset
of the broader idea of international law. But it is not always clear
what "customary international law" means, particularly in terms of
the extent to which treaty law and judicial decisions are relevant in
determining whether a legal principle has become customary
international law and is thus binding upon states. As one scholar has
noted, "[t]he determination of customary international law is more an
art than a scientific method." '145
In fact, all of the NAFTA Parties were undoubtedly aware of these
definitions of customary international law, and officials presumably
felt that several NAFTA tribunals had overreached. It may well be
that they intended at the time to argue, as they did in the cases
discussed below, that the customary international law of "minimum
standard of treatment" and "fair and equitable treatment" had not
evolved significantly in recent years, or at least that regardless of any
evolution, the threshold for demonstrating a violation of customary
international law in this area remains very high. The Parties were
likely even more concerned that if NAFTA's concept of international
law was not limited to customary international law, it might
encompass any treaty or treaty provision rather than an explicit right
under Section A of Chapter 11. As outside counsel for the Mexican
government noted that:
if Article 1105's reference to international law granted jurisdiction to a
tribunal to determine breaches of the rest of NAFTA itself and of other
treaties... investor-state arbitration would be available for. .. the rest of
NAFTA, the WTO and any other treaties to which the respondent state
was a party.'
46
In any event, the July 2001 Interpretation came after Metalclad
was already final, and the British Columbia Supreme Court had
already reviewed the Metalclad decision and decided that a denial of
144. Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-A.
145. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (4th ed.
2003).
146. J. C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
433, 449 (2002); see also Kirkman, supra note 35, at 391 (asserting that a broad
reading of international law to encompass the parties' obligations under other
international agreements is "illogical in light of the NAFTA's purpose, structure
and jurisprudence").
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transparency was not an actionable Chapter 11 violation under
Article 1105, because transparency was neither an explicit
requirement of Chapter 11, Section A, nor of customary international
law. 147
In the then ongoing Pope & Talbot case, all three NAFTA
governments argued that the applicable customary international law
standard of "fair and equitable treatment" was essentially frozen with
the Neer case in 1926. The governments advanced this argument
notwithstanding the hundreds of bilateral investment treaties and
various arbitral and judicial decisions, treatises, and other source
materials that suggested that the standard to which a state was bound
was something more than avoiding conduct that was outrageous or
shocked the conscience.
1 48
The Pope & Talbot Tribunal, however, was not receptive to this
approach, suggesting that the Interpretation was in fact a back-door
effort to amend NAFTA without the benefit of approval through the
constitutional processes of each Party. 149 The tribunal focused
specifically on the absence of the phrase "customary international
law" in NAFTA's travaux preparatoires.50 Despite viewing the
NAFTA Parties' attempt to narrow the applicability of the term
international law through an Interpretation as illegal, the tribunal
ultimately found that the Interpretation in question was binding, but
it refused to accept the static version of customary law advanced by
Canada and the other Parties. 5 '
147. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.C.L.R.3d 359
para. 68 (stating that "no proper basis" existed for the tribunal's readings of
international law).
148. But see Kirkman, supra note 35, at 391-92 (concluding that the Neer
standard is too narrow, especially considering the history of friendly relations
among the parties and the treatment each NAFTA Party offers stronger investment
protection in their BITs with states with which the Parties have weaker
relationships).
149. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1352-53 (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. (May 31, 2002)) (stating that each Party must obtain formal approval to
modify or add to the Agreement).
150. See id. at 1355 (quoting counsel for Canada: "Let me make it easy for
everybody... I happen to know if there are any traveaux preparatoires, and I can
tell you that I have not been able to find any").
151. Id. at 1356-57.
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Instead, the tribunal opined that the "range of actions subject to
international concern has broadened since the 1920s" to "include the
concept of fair and equitable treatment." '152 The tribunal found that
this principle was recognized by the OECD, was central to the 1800
BITs negotiated to protect foreign owned property, and was thus
clear evidence of state practice towards the formation of customary
international law. "I However, the tribunal did not formally decide
the applicable standard because, regardless of any particular
standard, Canada's Softwood Lumber division was found to have
violated Article 1105 by treating Pope & Talbot in an egregious
manner.1
54
Several subsequent tribunals have struggled with the same issues
and have backed away from the idea that an interpretation may go
beyond the scope of what can properly be done by NAFTA
governments under Article 1131(2) without actually amending
NAFTA. 155 These subsequent tribunals have been equally adamant in
rejecting the idea that the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" is
frozen in time. All of these cases were pending during much of the
negotiations of the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA. In Mondev v.
United States, the Claimant directly challenged the Interpretation, the
meaning of fair and equitable treatment and the requirements of
customary international law. Therefore the tribunal reviewed not
only Article 1105, but also had to consider these factors as well.
156
However, since Mondev had chosen to invoke the protection of local
courts, which had decided against the firm, the tribunal limited its
152. Id. at 1357.
153. See id. at 1357-58 (noting also that the OECD Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property recognized fair and equitable treatment as required
by customary international law).
154. Id. at 1359.
155. See discussion infra notes 156-196 (discussing the attempts of the arbitral
tribunals to interpret the language of NAFTA as well as particular cases that have
directed the trend of these efforts).
156. See Mondev v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85, 102 (2003) (ICSID (W. Bank)
Oct. 11, 2002) (acknowledging that extensive debate took place regarding the
meaning and scope of Article 1105 as interpreted by the Commission).
Specifically, this debate centered on both the meaning of particular terms within
the language of the Article as well as to what extent the rubric of the "minimum
standard of treatment" under international law included customary international
law duties.) Id. at 103.
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review to "that aspect of the Article 1105(1) which concerns what is
commonly called denial of justice, that is to say, with the standard of
treatment of aliens applicable to decisions of the host State's courts
or tribunals."'
157
Like Pope & Talbot, Mondev also argued that the Interpretation
was effectively an amendment to NAFTA, permitted only "with the
applicable legal procedures of each Party."'1 58 If the appropriate
standard was found to be customary international law, Mondev
argued that "that law had to be given its current content, as it has
been shaped by the conclusion of hundreds of bilateral investment
treaties, including NAFTA, and by modem international judgments
and arbitral awards."' 59
The United States, in defending the Interpretation and criticizing
the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, contended that "customary international
law" meant just that, and the BITs were not relevant unless it could
be shown that they reflected opinio juris.160 The United States also
sought to discredit arbitral decisions that attempted to apply
standards of customary international law based on a specific treaty.'6'
Both Mexico and Canada admitted that the customary international
law standard could evolve over time. However, both countries but
still argued that the threshold for finding a violation of customary
international law in this area was high, or required evidence of an
"arbitrary action substituted for the rule of law" for a violation. 62
In Mondev, the tribunal examined whether the content of
customary international law providing for fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security in investment treaties was
any different than it was in the 1920s. 63 The tribunal held that the
157. Id. at 103.
158. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2202(2).
159. Mondev v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85, 104 (2003) (ICSID (W. Bank) Oct.
11, 2002).
160. Id. at 104. By virtue of the fact that the Pope & Talbot case relied upon the
Chamber decision in the ELSI case and without any consideration for opinio juris,
the United States contended that the decision did not reflect a true development in
customary international law. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 106.
163. Id. at 106-09.
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"substantive and procedural rights of the individual in international
law have undergone considerable development," "to the modern eye,
what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or
egregious," and that "a State may treat foreign investment unfairly
and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith."'
164
The tribunal also recognized that dozens of nations' BITs had
influenced the content of the rules governing the treatment of foreign
investment in current international law by obligating parties to
accord foreign investment fair and equitable treatment.'65 While the
United States conceded the significance of the jurisprudence of state
practice and arbitral tribunals, it also contended that a tribunal still
could not "adopt its own idiosyncratic standard of what is 'fair or
equitable' without reference to established sources of law. ' 166 The
tribunal reasoned that the reference to "customary international law"
in the Interpretation must mean that status of that body of law no
earlier than 1994, when the NAFTA came into force. 167 As a result,
where the tribunal found no denial of justice, there could be no
violation of Article 1105, and the tribunal dismissed Mondev's
claim. 1 68 In the course of its opinion, the tribunal essentially assumed
that the Interpretation was valid, and focused instead on the content
of customary international law. 169 Additionally, the value of the
Mondev Tribunal's analysis is probably enhanced by the fact that one
of the arbitrators was Stephen M. Schwebel, a former president of
the International Court of Justice.
164. Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 106.
165. See id. at 107-08 (tribunal observing that the phenomena of many states
voluntarily acting to address foreign investment through the utilization of BITs
would necessarily influence the content of the current international legal rules
overseeing the treatment of foreign investment).
166. Id. at 108.
167. See id. at 109 (holding that the interpretation of the phrase "customary
international law" is not limited to international law of either the nineteenth
century or the first half of the twentieth century, though there are relevant
decisions from those periods). The tribunal went on to state that the Commission
interpretation of Article 1105(1) did encompass current international law, the
content of which is defined by the conclusion of over two thousand BITs as well as
many other commerce and friendship treaties. Id.
168. Id. at 116.
169. Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 107.
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A similar analysis occurred in ADF Group v. United States, where
the tribunal focused on the key question of whether the enforcement
of a federal "Buy American" provision precluded ADF from
fabricating steel for guardrails to be sold in Virginia, and was
therefore a violation of Article 1105.170 Here, as in both Pope &
Talbot and Mondev, the investor challenged the Interpretation, in this
instance by arguing that it was up to the tribunal to determine
whether it was a "true interpretation" or an amendment to NAFTA.
171
The tribunal, however, accepted the NAFTA Parties' advisement that
the Interpretation was not meant to be an amendment, observing that
nothing in NAFTA suggests that "a Chapter 11 tribunal may
determine for itself whether a document submitted to it as an
interpretations by the Parties acting through the FTC is in fact an
amendment which presumably may be disregarded until ratified by
all the Parties under their respective internal law."'
172
Thus, customary international law is the standard applicable in
Article 1105.173 However, the tribunal recognized that Article 1105 is
something more than a rule against discrimination between domestic
and foreign investors. 7 4 Presently, the United States, Mexico, and
Canada all agree that the Interpretation refers to customary
170. See ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, paras. 44-55 (ICSID (W. Bank) Jan.
9, 2003) (describing the dispute from which the case arose), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
According to the facts of the case, the "Buy America" clause, included to ensure
compliance with 23 C.F.R. 635.410, forced ADF Group, Inc. to fabricate steel
bridge components at various domestic subcontracting facilities as opposed to
importing the components into Canada for fabrication. Id. As a result, estimated
costs for ADF Group, Inc.'s fulfilling the subcontract increased "massively." Id.
171. Id. para. 177.
172. Id. The tribunal further opined that following such a proposition would
result in the dilution of the binding nature of Commission interpretations. Id.
173. See id. (the tribunal concluding there was no obligation to try to determine
whether the Commission had either interpreted or attempted to amend NAFTA).
174. See id. para. 178. "Where the treatment accorded by a State under its
domestic law to its own nationals falls below the minimum standard of treatment
required by customary international law, non-nationals become entitled to better
treatment than that which the State accords under its domestic law." Id.
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international law as it exists today," 5 although Mexico and Canada
continue to remind tribunals that "the threshold remains high" for a
violation of that standard. 
76
However, this does not mean that the investor had demonstrated
that there exists, "a general and autonomous requirement
(autonomous, that is, from specific rules addressing particular,
limited, contexts) to accord fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security to foreign investments" in today's customary
international law. "I7 In ADF Group, the investor simply did not
make his case that such U.S. domestic measures as domestic content
and performance requirements in the peculiar context of government
procurement are violations of fair and equitable treatment as that
term is used in NAFTA.
178
In UPS v. Canada, UPS charged that Canada violated its rights
under NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1105 with regard to the powers
exercised by Canada Post, the government postal monopoly, in its
non-monopoly operations that were in competition with UPS' small
package delivery services. 179 UPS claimed in part that the Canadian
Post monopoly was inconsistent with Canada's obligation to provide
UPS with fair and equitable treatment under international law, by
ensuring "the existence of a transparent and effective regime for the
supervision and regulation of Canada Post in the non-monopoly
175. ADF Group, Inc., para. 179. According to the tribunal, the interpretation of
"customary international law" in NAFTA Article 1105(1) is not a fixed standard of
minimum treatment but rather is in a constant process of development. Id.
176. Id. para. 179.
177. Id. para. 183.
178. See id. paras. 188, 192 (noting that NAFTA, in Chapter 10, treats
government procurement of goods and services separately from other trade in
goods and services). Under Article 1108(8)(b), the performance requirements ban
in Article 1106 does not apply to "procurement by a party or state enterprise" but
that language is inapplicable to Article 1105. Id.
179. UPS v. Canada, paras. 9-10 (ICSID (W. Bank) Nov. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/Jurisdiction%20Award.22Nov02.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
These allegations included questions of the fairness and appropriateness of Canada
Post's actions, that it was an unfair competitor in a manner detrimental to private
sector competitors, and that Canada Post's ability to utilize a publicly funded
network based on a government-granted monopoly allowed for an unfair pricing
advantage. Id.
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postal market in Canada," thus affording Canada Post a competitive
advantage.18 ° UPS also specifically alleged that Canada's Article
1105 obligations "included not engaging in anti-competitive
practices while exercising governmental authority," 181 and Canada's
alleged failure to enforce its antitrust laws was a violation of Article
1 105.182
Canada at the time was still arguing that to constitute a violation of
Article 1105, government action must amount to "an outrage, to bad
faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency" of
government action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable person would recognize its insufficiency. 183 The tribunal
agreed that a rule of customary international law required a
demonstration both of actual state practice and opinio juris of
states."'84 The tribunal also noted that "obligations imposed by
customary international law may and do evolve," but that treaties
have "an important role in recording and defining rules deriving from
custom."'85 However, in UPS, there was no indication that any
national competition laws had been "enacted out of a sense of
general international legal obligation."' 86 Under such circumstances,
the tribunal concluded that "there is no rule of customary
international law prohibiting or regulating anti-competitive
behavior."' 87
The tribunal also examined the question of whether, even under
the "additive" approach, a state must have anti-competition laws in
order to meet its obligation to foreign investors to provide fair and
equitable treatment. The UPS tribunal determined that this was not
the case, held that the "additive" approach was erroneous, and found
180. Id, para. 72.
181. Id. para. 73.
182. Id.
183. Id. para. 78.
184. See id. para. 84 (citing the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 27 (June 3)).
185. See UPS., para. 84.
186. Id. para. 85. The tribunal also noted that only beginning in November 2001,
with the Doha WTO Ministerial meeting, did the Members begin "to address the
possibility of negotiating competition rules on a multilateral basis." Id. para. 87.
187. Id. para. 92.
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that Article 1105 obligations imposed no requirement for laws on
anti-competitive behavior.188 The tribunal discussed both claims
because it determined that it had no jurisdiction to proceed under
Article 1105 or under NAFTA Chapter 15, relating to competitive
policy. 8 9
The tribunal in Methanex v. United States originally dismissed
Methanex's complaint relating to California's ban of the gasoline
additive methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") because, in the
tribunal's view the measures in question were not sufficiently
connected to Methanex's investment in facilities for the production
and marketing of methanol. 190 Specifically, the tribunal held that "the
phrase 'relating to' in NAFTA Article 1101(1) signifies something
more than the mere effect of a measure on an investor or an
investment and that it requires a legally significant connection
between them."' 91 Methanex then re-filed the complaint, claiming
that 1) the connection between the California action and Methanex
was legally significant and is "related to" an investment; and 2) that
California intended to harm foreign methanol producers by banning
MTBE.192
Article 1105 is also at issue in Methanex's current proceeding. In
addition to attacking the tribunal's "relating to" determination,
Methanex has argued that the Interpretation was irrelevant to its case
and that the tribunal should disregard it. The United States, however,
asserted that the Interpretation "establishes that many of Methanex's
arguments based on Article 1105(1) are ill-founded."' 93 The United
188. Id. paras. 97-99.
189. Id. para. 134. The UPS case was refilled and remains pending. See
Investor's Revised, Amended Statement of Claim, UPS v. Canada (Dec. 20, 2002)
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/RevisedAmended.pdf (visited Apr. 12, 2004).
190. Methanex Corp. v. United States, para. 147 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Aug. 7,
2002)), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2004)
191. Id.
192. Claimant Methanex Corporation's Second Amended Statement of Claim,
Methanex v. United States, paras. 142-280 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Nov. 5, 2002)),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf.
193. Response of Respondent United States of America to Methanex's
Submission Concerning the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's July 31, 2001
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States argued, as it had previously, that the tribunal did not have a
right to review the validity of an Interpretation, and that in any event
the "customary international law" Interpretation was consistent with
"thirty years of state practice."'94 The United States also argued that
"fair and equitable treatment" did not go beyond the requirements of
customary international law, and did not incorporate broad concepts
of "equity, fairness, due process and appropriate protection."'' 95
Furthermore, the United States offered that Article 1105 would not
permit claims "based on violations of WTO or other conventional
international obligations."' 9 6 The Methanex tribunal has not yet ruled
on any of the substantive violations of Chapter 11 charged by
Methanex, including those based on Article 1105(1).
C. THE CHILE FTA LANGUAGE
With this background, we turn to the Chile FTA changes, which
are also reflected in most subsequent FTAs and in the 2004 Model
BIT. While the operative language of NAFTA Article 1105 is quite
brief, the operative language of Article 10.4 of the Chile FTA
provides considerably more detail than previous investment
agreements "with respect to the standards of treatment of aliens and
their property found in customary international law."' 97
Interpretation, Oct. 26, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter U.S. Response], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6028.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 8.
197. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF U.S. - CHILE
INVESTMENT CHAPTER (2003) [hereinafter USTR Summary], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/summaries/Chile%201nvestment%20Summary.
PDF (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); see also, Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.4:
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of
treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and
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It is unlikely that either U.S. or Chilean investors will be able to
argue that there has been an ultra vires effort to amend the treaty
since both parties have structured paragraph one of the Chile FTA to
ensure no confusion as to the applicability of "customary
international law" rather than simply "international law."'
198
Similarly, the parties attempted to address the vagueness of "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" by clarifying
that those concepts are not additive to the requirement of compliance
with customary international law, but rather, are part of that
concept. 99 Thus, "fair and equitable treatment" is defined as
including, but not limited to, avoiding a denial of justice, and the
concept of "due process embodied in the principal legal systems of
the world."200
The latter section of Article 10.4(2) of the Chile FTA also serves
the purpose of reflecting the language of the TPA in seeking to
do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph [1] to
provide:
(a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with
the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the
world; and
(b) "full protection and security" requires each Party to provide the level of
police protection required under customary international law.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provisions of this
Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of this Article.
4. Notwithstanding Article 10.7(5)(b), each Party shall accord to investors of
the other Party, and to covered investment, non-discriminatory treatment with
respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to loses suffered by
investments in its territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife.
Id.;
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that "customary international
law" . . . results from a general and consistent practice of States that they
follow from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 10.4, the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to
all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and
interests of aliens.
Id. Annex- IOA.
198. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.4(1).
199. Id.,. art. 10.4(2).
200. Id. art. 10.4(2)(a).
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equate fair and equitable treatment under customary international law
with the U.S. standards of due process, so that the former is not
broader than the latter.R0 ' Presumably, the reference to due process in
the principal legal systems of the world, rather than just in the United
States, is an effort to avoid reducing "fair and equitable treatment" to
no more than non-discriminatory treatment where national treatment
does not meet minimum standards of customary international law.20 2
Also, the link to due process effectively would buttress the United
States' position in cases such as Loewen, where the allegations of
denial of justice were effectively those of a denial of procedural due
process, with the issue being whether the seriousness of the denial
rises to the level of a violation of customary international law.
At the same time, the language "principal legal systems of the
world" seems at least partly inconsistent with what the United States
has argued in Methanex, that "fair and equitable treatment" does not
incorporate broad concepts of "equity, fairness, due process and
appropriate protection. '"2 3 If these concepts are relevant to defining
"fair and equitable treatment" and are found in principal legal
systems of the world, it would seem difficult to argue at the same
time that they would not also be relevant to determining the content
of customary international law.
Article 10.4(3) of the Chile FTA essentially adopts paragraph
three of the Interpretation, and eliminates the practice enunciated in
S.D. Myers of using an NAFTA Article 1102 violation as the
principal basis for finding an Article 1105 "fair and equitable
treatment" violation.204 This article could also help to avoid the
bootstrapping engaged in by the Metalclad tribunal, where a
violation of Article 1105 was used to support a finding of indirect
expropriation under Article 1110. The new language also avoids a
201. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (2002) ("[S]eeking to establish standards for fair
and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal principles and practice,
including the principle of due process").
202. See id. (lacking a definition for "[p]rincipal legal systems of the world").
Presumably, arbitral tribunals would have to decide which nations and/or legal
systems-common law, civil law, Islamic law, etc.-meet this criterion for
inclusion.
203. See U.S. Response, supra note 193, at 6-7 (discussing the United States'
argument that Methanex's interpretation is too broad).
204. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.4(3).
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possible argument by a claimant that the violation by a government
of one of the provisions of a separate international agreement is in
itself a denial of fair and equitable treatment.
In addition, Annex 10-A to the Chile FTA provides a classical
definition of customary international law, °5 which possibly could
have shortened the debate over the meaning of customary
international law in such cases as Mondev, ADF, and UPS had this
annex been included in NAFTA. However, the definition of
customary international law in the Chile FTA fails to deal directly
with the more critical question of the current scope of customary
international law encountered when a tribunal attempts to define the
reach of "fair and equitable treatment." Given that the United States
has conceded that customary international law in this area has
evolved since 1926, and continues to evolve, it would probably have
been unwise for the United States to go beyond incorporating due
process into the standard required for "fair and equitable treatment."
Finally, Article 10.21(3) of the Chile FTA provides subtle
clarification to the scope of an Interpretation as previously explained
in NAFTA Article 1131(2). Where Article 1131(2) of NAFTA
provided that "[a]n interpretation by the Commission of a provision
of this Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal established under
this section," 2°6 Article 10.21(3) of the Chile FTA provides that "[a]
decision of the Commission declaring its interpretation of a provision
of this Agreement under Article 21.1 (Free Trade Commission) shall
be binding on a tribunal established under this section, and any
award must be consistent with that decision. '2 7 Referring to a
"decision ... declaring ... interpretation" suggests that the
interpretation exists and is just being pointed out by the Commission,
perhaps making it more difficult (although by no means impossible)
for a party to argue that the interpretation is an amendment. The final
phrase clearly explains the meaning of "binding:" put simply, the
tribunal has to follow the interpretation.
205. See id., Annex 10-A ("The Parties confirm their shared understanding that
'customary international law' generally and as specifically referenced in Articles
10.4 and 10.9 results from a general and consistent practice of States that they
follow from a sense of legal obligation.").
206. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2).
207. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(3).
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D. OTHER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS
The "Minimum Standard of Treatment" language of Article 15.5
of the Singapore FTA is essentially identical to that of the Chile
FTA, and the language of Annex 10-A of the Chile FTA is identical
in all substantive respects to an exchange of letters on customary
international law that "shall form an integral part of the [United
States - Chile Free Trade] Agreement."2 °8 The Canada - Chile FTA,
negotiated seven years ago, does not depart from NAFTA in its "fair
and equitable treatment" language, even with regard to adding a
reference to "customary" before "international law."209 This is not
surprising, because the first decision under Chapter 11 (Ethyl Corp.
v. Canada) was not rendered until 1998, and that determination was
procedural. 10
Negotiations towards a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
("FTAA") began years before the negotiations of the Chile FTA and
Singapore FTA, and are likely to continue in the future. The concept
of an FTAA was agreed to in principle by the Presidents of the
thirty-four nations of the Western Hemisphere (less Cuba) in Miami,
Florida, in 1994.11 A text, including investment provisions, was
made public in July 3, 2001,212 and revised versions were published
in 2002 and 2003.213 The almost completely bracketed text reflects
208. Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.26.
209. Canada-Chile FTA, supra note 5, art. G-05.
210. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (June 24,
1998))
211. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, First Summit of the Americas
Declaration of Miami, December 19-11, 1994 (resolving to begin construction of
the FTAA and conclude negotiations no later than 2005), at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/Summits/Miami/declarae.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
212. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Zoellick
Says Publication of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Text Will Help
Explain Trade Benefits (July, 3, 2001) (relaying news of the published FTAA text
as a result of a promise by those leaders involved in order to make negotiation a
more "transparent and accessible" process),
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2004);
Free Trade Area of the Americas, First Draft Agreement, http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/FTAADraft/draft-e.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
213. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement,
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft02/draft-e.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2004); Free
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proposals by many participating countries, and language proposed by
the United States reflects developments in language similar to what
is found in the Singapore FTA and Chile FTA. While the FTAA
language represents the first major step in the evolution from
NAFTA to the Chile FTA or Singapore FTA,1 4 nothing in the FTAA
context with regard to investment has been agreed upon, and the
prospects of concluding a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas by
the specified 2005 date seem problematic at best.
215
Interestingly, the FTAA language on fair and equitable treatment
reflected some evolution between the July 3, 2001 draft and the draft
released October 31, 2002. The July 3, 2001, draft contained a single
paragraph with suggested language reflecting many of the author
nations' differences in views, but none of the significant updates
found in the Chile FTA or Singapore FTA.21 6 The 2002 draft
Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft Agreement [hereinafter Third Draft
Agreement], http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index-e.asp (last visited Feb.
15, 2004).
214. See 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 96 (noting than an examination of
the U.S. bilateral investment treaty program reflects no significant changes). The
1994 "model" U.S. BIT that remains on U.S. government websites, essentially a
pre-NAFTA document, had not changed since 1994, and most recent U.S. BITs -
all with developing countries - followed that model. Id. For example, the Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of American and the Governmen of
the Republic of El Salvador for the Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of
Investment do not deviate significantly from the 1994 model BIT. See Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of
the Republic of El Salvador for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment (Oct. 3, 1999), http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/usecu-e.asp (last visited
Feb. 9, 2004) It is only very recently that a 2004 Model BIT has been promulgated,
and this new version-reflecting the Chile and Singapore FTA changes-will
remain in draft form until the interagency consultation process is complete.
215. See David Haskell and Rosella Brevetti, Hemisphere Free Trade Talks
Stall Again Over U.S.-Mercosur Agriculture Split, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. 617 (Apr.
8, 2004) (reporting yet another postponement of FTAA negotiations due to
disagreements between Brazil and the United States on services, investment,
government procurement and government subsidies). At the time of this writing,
the chances of completing negotiations toward a comprehensive FTAA, one that
includes investor protection, are exceedingly dim.
216. First Draft Agreement, supra note 212, ch. on Investment, art. 6.
[1. [Each Party] [A Party] [Each Contracting Party] [shall accord] [shall
ensure] [shall at all times ensure] [to the investments of the investors of
another Party] [to the investors of another Party and their investments] [to the
investments of investors of one of the Contracting Parties] [to the investments
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
contained minor changes to previous text, but also included three
new paragraphs that appear to have been taken almost verbatim from
the Interpretation.1 7
The November 2003 version incorporated additional minor
changes, but also made significant further changes with the inclusion
of language that mirrored the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA.1 s
Based on the inclusion of these clauses to date, one can presume that
when and if the negotiations of an FTAA with investment provisions
are concluded, the United States will have succeeded in
of investors of the other Contracting Parties, made in keeping with the present
Agreement] [to covered investments of investors of the other Parties] [to the
investments of another Contracting Party] [treatment in accordance with
international law, including] fair and equitable treatment [within its territory]
[as well as full protection and security] [as well as juridical protection and
security within its territory] [in accordance with the norms and principles of
international law] [in accordance with principles of international law] [and
shall not impair their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal
through unjustified or discriminatory measures] [and shall ensure that the
exercise of the rights recognized herein are not impaired in practice.]].
Id.
217.Second Draft Agreement, supra note 213, ch. on Investment, art. 6.
[1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with the customary international law standard of
treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security.
2. For greater certainty, the concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and
"full protection and security" mentioned in paragraph 1 do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that
there has been a breach of this Article.]
Id.
218. See Third Draft Agreement, supra note 213, ch. XVII, art. 9.
[The obligation in paragraph [9.1] to provide:
a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in
criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with
the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the
world; and
b) "full protection and security" requires each Party to provide the level of
police protection required under customary international law.]
Id.
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incorporating language in the FTAA similar to the Chile FTA and
the Singapore FTA for "fair and equitable treatment."2 19
V. EXPROPRIATION UNDER ARTICLE 1110 OF
NAFTA
There is more than a little irony in the fact that nearly ten years
after NAFTA entered into force, despite a great deal of concern
expressed by the U.S. government, the Congress, and the public
regarding NAFTA's expropriation provisions, only one NAFTA
tribunal has found a violation of Article 1110. In that instance the
taking was effectively direct and complete.2 0 While several other
tribunals have considered Article 1110 claims in the context of
alleged indirect or "creeping" expropriations, explicitly or implicitly
seeking compensation for partial takings, no tribunal has found in
favor of such a claimant.1
2
Nevertheless, the concerns are not idle, and even those tribunals
rejecting Article 1110 claims have struggled over the concept.
Tribunals have made, and will continue to make, determinations on a
219. See Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of
Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) (suggesting that the drafters admired Chile's similar
goals and commitments towards advancing free and open trade and investment in
the America's and around the world). However, it is evident that some, such as
Brazil, do not share the Chilean - U.S. goals. See supra note 215 and
accompanying text.
220. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 50-51 (2001)
(ICSID (W. Bank) Aug. 30, 2000) (holding that the representations of the Mexican
federal government as to its authority to authorize the hazardous waste site, and the
absence of any basis for the municipality's denial of construction permits
amounted to an indirect expropriation).
221. See Azinian v. United Mexican States, 39 I.L.M. 537, 555 (2000) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Nov. 1, 1999) (holding that Mexico's annulment of a concession
contract did not violate its obligations under NAFTA); see also Pope & Talbot,
Inc., v. Canada, paras. 100-01 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Jun. 26, 2000)) (emphasizing
that an incidental interference in an investment activity does not constitute
expropriation), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com!cases/P&T-
INTERIM%20AWARD.PDF (last visited Apr. 9, 2004); S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Nov. 13, 2000)) (holding that
regulations are generally not considered as expropriation and constitute a lesser
degree of interference); Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625, 669
(2003) (ICSID (W. Bank) Dec. 16, 2002) (finding no expropriation).
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case-by-case basis as to whether a government regulatory action is a
legitimate or an indirect expropriation. Because of this approach, the
outcome of an expropriation claim is probably more difficult to
predict than with regard to any other provision of Chapter 11,
including Article 1105.221
A. THE NAFTA CASES
The first NAFTA decision, Azinian v. Mexico, was an alleged
taking of a concession contract for a waste disposal plant.223
However, the tribunal never reached the expropriation issue. Rather,
the tribunal observed that the claimants only challenged the actions
of the municipality in terminating the concession contract, but had
never criticized court decisions as being violations of NAFTA
provisions. 24 The tribunal held that if the courts determined the
contract to be invalid, and the claimant did not raise an objection to
that court decision, there was, by definition, no contract to be
expropriated.225
In Pope & Talbot, the claimant contended that Canada's lumber
export control regime amounted to a taking of its property by
reducing the firm's exports to its traditional U.S. market.226 The
claimant argued that Article 1110 went beyond customary
international law, and that the inclusion of the phrase "tantamount to
expropriation" allowed the consideration of creeping expropriation
that included "non-discriminatory measures of general application
which have the effect of substantially interfering with investments of
investors of NAFTA Parties. 227 Canada argued that the right to sell
lumber in the U.S. market was not a property right and that there had
been no deprivation of the claimant's investment, given that it had
continued to export lumber at all relevant times.228 Moreover, "mere
222. See supra Part IV.
223. See Azinian, 39 I.L.M. at 547-48 (describing the essential chronology and
the relief that claimant sought).
224. Id. at 552.
225. Id.
226. Pope & Talbot, Inc., para. 81 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Jun. 26, 2000)).
227. Id. paras. 81, 84.
228. Id. para. 87.
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interference is not expropriation; rather, a significant degree of
deprivation of fundamental rights of ownership is required.
22 9
Canada also asserted that the term "tantamount" simply meant
"equivalent," and did not expand Article 1110's coverage beyond
creeping expropriation to cover regulatory action.230  Despite
Canada's arguments, the tribunal rejected Canada's more narrow
interpretation of Article 1110, partially accepted the applicant's
broader interpretation, but ultimately found no expropriatory action
under Article 1110.231 The lumber export control regime was
considered not to be the "substantial deprivation" required for a
finding of expropriation under Article 1110.232 While the Pope &
Talbot tribunal found that Canada's regulations did not amount to
creeping expropriation, the tribunal did affirm that it might have
considered regulations as creeping expropriation under different
circumstances.233
229. Id. paras. 87-88.
230. See id. para. 89 (noting also that "creeping expropriation" is not a term
used in treaty drafting).
231. See id. para. 96 (holding that investor's access to the U.S. market was a
property interest subject to protection under Article 1110). The tribunal also held
that the scope of Article 1110 did cover a state's non-discriminatory regulatory
powers, and that "a blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a
gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation." Id. para. 99.
First of all, there is no allegation that the Investment [property] has been
nationalized or that the [export control] Regime is confiscatory .... The
investor remains in control of the Investment, it directs the day-to-day
operations of the Investment, and no officers or employees of the Investment
have been detained .... Canada does not supervise the work of the officers or
employees of the Investment, does not take any part of the proceeds of
company sales.., does not prevent the Investment from paying dividends to
its shareholders, does not interfere with the appointment of directors or
management and does not take any other actions outing the Investor from full
ownership and control of his investment.
Id. para. 100.
232. See Pope & Talbot, Inc., paras. 100-02 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. (Jun. 26, 2000))
(considering it significant that Pope & Talbot "continued to export substantial
quantities of softwood lumber to the United States and to earn substantial profits
on those sales"). The tribunal further suggested that in determining "whether a
particular interference with business activities amounts to an expropriation, the test
is whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that
the property has been 'taken' from its owner." Id.
233. Id.
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The S.D. Myers tribunal took a somewhat different approach. The
claimant, in addition to charging violations of national treatment and
fair and equitable treatment (on which claimant ultimately
prevailed), contended that when Canada barred exports of hazardous
waste to the firm's facilities in the United States it effectively took
actions "tantamount to expropriation" under Article 1110.234 The
tribunal was not sympathetic, and opined that the term
"expropriation" should be interpreted "in light of the whole body of
state practice, treaties and judicial interpretations of that term in
international law cases." '235 The tribunal then attempted to draw a
distinction between deprivation of ownership rights and the "lesser
interference" of regulation,236 noting that "[t]he distinction between
expropriation and regulation screens out most potential cases of
complaints concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces
the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they go about
their business of managing public affairs." '237  Moreover,
expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of
an owner to make use of its economic rights, although it would be
appropriate to view even partial or temporary deprivation as
amounting to expropriation in some circumstances.23
Ultimately, the tribunal decided that Canada's interference in S.D.
Myers' business was temporary, and thus not a violation of Article
1110.239 The NAFTA Parties likely found the tribunal's holding on
expropriation unexceptionable, but were probably less sanguine
about the willingness of the tribunal to consider a partial or
temporary deprivation of economic rights in some circumstances as a
violation of Article 1110.
234. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1422 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
(Nov. 13, 2000)).
235. Id. at 1440.
236. See id. (suggesting that expropriation tends to deprive individuals of
ownership rights, while regulations do not, thereby reducing interference).
237. Id.
238. See id. (observing that the words "tantamount to expropriation" were
designed to embrace the concept of creeping expropriation rather than to "expand
the internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation").
239. See id. (opining that although testimony stated that SDMI had lost some
competitive advantage, these facts did not support the conclusion that Canada's
actions constituted an expropriation under Article 1110).
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The decision in Metalclad v. Mexico also concerned an alleged
expropriation.2 4° Here, the firm obtained all the necessary federal
permits for its hazardous waste disposal facility, and relied on the
federal government's assurances that no state or municipal permits
were required. 24' However, the municipality denied Metalclad
permits purportedly required for Metalclad to legally operate its
facility. 242 The tribunal found that this action exceeded the
municipality's authority, "effectively and unlawfully prevented the
Claimant's operation of the landfill, ' 243 and amounted to an indirect
expropriation. 24
A British Columbia Supreme Court (trial court) reversed this
finding because it was based in part on the finding of Mexico's
obligation to provide transparency to Metalclad, an obligation not
found in Section A of Chapter 11 245 However, the breadth of the
arbitral opinion raises the issue of compensation for partial takings,
240. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 37 (2001) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Aug. 30, 2000).
241. See id. at 50 (noting tribunal's view that the Mexican Federal Government
fully approved and endorsed the project, and opining-presumably under Mexican
law-that the exclusive authority for approving and permitting a hazardous waste
landfill rested with the federal government).
242. See id. (based on the municipality's assertion that the land fill would result
in adverse environmental effects because of the geological unsuitability of the
landfill site).
243. Id.
244. Id. According to the tribunal, indirect expropriation
includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property...
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has
the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of the property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.
Id.
245. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.C.L.R. 3d 359 para.
72. The court also held that there was no evidence establishing that transparency
had become part of customary international law, and that the arbitral decision's
finding of an expropriation based in part on a lack of transparency was thus beyond
the scope of arbitration under Chapter 11. Id., paras. 68, 80; see also discussion
supra Part IV (arbitral tribunal determining that Mexico's regulatory scheme was
not adequately transparent and therefore was the key factor in the tribunal's finding
of a denial of fair and equitable treatment).
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which caused governments to become uncomfortable.246 Ironically,
as this discussion illustrates, the Metalclad tribunal effectively turned
a relatively straight-forward direct takings case into a much more
complex indirect taking. The governor of the State of San Luis de
Potosi, in his its final effort to block the hazardous waste site,
declared the concession area part of an "ecological preserve," which
effectively barred the landfill operation permanently, and rendered
Metalclad's investment worthless by permanently precluding
operation of the landfill. 47 While the tribunal also found in passing
that this was a "further ground for a finding of expropriation," '248 the
British Columbia Supreme Court relied solely upon this fleeting
reference in affirming the tribunal's determination.249 Arguably, the
decision would have been more logical if the tribunal had simply
found a direct (or indirect) expropriation as a result of the governor's
action, and avoiding unnecessary speculation over "incidental
interference," which was far from the situation here.25°
In Feldman v. Mexico, the claimant alleged that a series of actions
by the Mexican government constituted a "creeping" or indirect
expropriation under Article 1 1 10.251 The allegations surrounded the
claimant's efforts to obtain domestic excise tax rebates on cigarettes
that the claimant purchased from retailers for export, essentially a
"gray market" export scheme.252 However, the tribunal declined to
246. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 36, 50 (2001) (ICSID (W.
Bank) Aug. 30, 2000) ("Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property ... but also covert or incidental
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner,
in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably- to-be-expected economic
benefit of property ... .
247. Id. at 44.
248. Id.
249. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.C.L.R.3d 359 paras. 94, 95.
250. See Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 51 (emphasizing that the tribunal
considered that the implementation of the ecological degree would, in and of itself,
constitute an act tantamount to expropriation).
251. Feldman v. United Mexican States, 42 I.L.M. 625, 642-43 (2003) (ICSID
(W. Bank) Dec. 16, 2002).
252. Id. The tribunal was of the view NAFTA and customary international law
does not require a state to permit a "gray market" scheme on the importation of
cigarettes. Id. at 649.
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find an expropriation, in part because Feldman's exporting business
"remained under the complete control of the Claimant with the
apparent right to engage in the exportation" of almost anything other
than cigarettes." 3 It also suggested that "not every business problem
experienced by a foreign investor is an expropriation under Article
1 10."1214
A decision on the merits in Methanex has potentially great
importance in terms of shaping government and public policy with
regard to the dividing line between a compensable taking and valid
government regulation. However, developments since the initial
filing make a decision based on a finding for or against expropriation
unlikely.255 Methanex's claim arose out of an Executive Order in
which the State of California directed the removal of a gasoline
additive, known as MTBE from all gasoline. 6 California appears to
253. Id. at 648.
254. Id. at 648. A majority of the tribunal did find a violation by Mexico of the
claimant's right to national treatment under Article 1102. Id. at 669.
255. See Kirkman, supra note 35, at 388-389 (summarizing Methanex's Second
Amended Statement of claim focusing on alleged discrimination against Methanex
by the California authorities).
256. See News Release, Methanex Corp., Methanex Seeks Damages Under
NAFTA for California MTBE Ban (June 15, 1999), at
http://www.methanex.com/investorcentre/newsreleases/nafta.pdf (last visited Feb.
9, 2004).
MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) is a gasoline component manufactured
from methanol and isobutylene by oil refiners and chemical manufacturers.
Since the 1970s, MTBE has been used as an affordable and effective source
of octane, first as lead was phased-out of gasoline and subsequently as
gasoline aromatics levels, including benzene, have been reduced. Since the
mid- 1 990s, clean air legislation has required the use of oxygenates in gasoline
(reformulated gasoline) to reduce tailpipe emissions. MTBE is the refiners'
oxygenate of choice.
Id.; see also Notice of a Submission of a Claim to Arbitration, Methanex Corp. v.
United States, 8 (Dec. 3, 1999) (arguing that the actions of the California State
Legislature and the Governor of California constitute an interference with and
taking of Methanex U.S.' and Fortier's business and investment), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8773.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
But see Exec. Order No. D-52-02 (Cal. 2002) (declaring an extension of one year
past the December 31, 2002 deadline in order to avoid risking any problems with
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have decided to discontinue the use of MTBE because of a
University of California at Davis study that concluded that "MTBE
use did not significantly benefit air quality, but its use did cause
significant risks and costs to water contamination. 25 7 Methanex
conceded that MTBE was a pollutant of underground aquifers and
that remediation (largely through better control of underground
storage tanks) was needed, but also argued that there was no
scientific proof that exposure to MTBE was dangerous to human
health at "reasonably expected exposure levels," '58  despite
considerable research on the subject.25 9 Of course, most of the
alternatives to MTBE, such as ethanol, raise environmental or human
health questions as well.
While Methanex does not manufacture MTBE,26° Methanex
claimed to be the world's largest producer and marketer of methanol
&sTitle=Executive+Orders+++&sCatTitle=Executive+Orders&sSubCat=null&iOI
D=29861 (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
257. See UAW Local 2209, NAFTA 's Investor "Rights ": A Corporate Dream, A
Citizen Nightmare (mentioning Governor Gray Davis's statement, in reaction to
the University of California at Davis study, that the use of MTBE poses a
significant environmental risk ), at http://www.local2209.org/NAFTA/default2.asp
(last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
258. See Q&A BACKGROUND ON METHANEX'S NAFTA CLAIM AND MTBE 4
(2000) [hereinafter Q&A Background], available at
http://www.methanex.com/newsroomlmtbe/naftaQ%26A.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2004).
259. See ARTURO KELLER ET AL., HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
OF MTBE: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA AS SPONSORED BY SB 521 38-40 (1998) (explaining the extensive
research by the University of California at Davis which determined that the
proposed Secondary Drinking Water Standard for MTBE would be adequate to
protect human health), available at http://tsrtp.ucdavis.edu/mtberpt/voll.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004). However, MTBE imparts an undesirable odor to the water
that is noticeable to consumers and appears to penetrate underground aquifers
more quickly and pervasively than other chemicals found in motor fuels. See Q&A
Background, supra note 258, at 5 (noting that according to Methanex claims,
MTBE is more soluble than other gasoline additives and travels faster and farther);
see also David Stout, E.P.A. Urges Substitution of an Additive to Gasoline, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at A20 (explaining that although MTBE may make the air
cleaner, it can leak into wells). Even low concentrations of MTBE can cause water
to smell bad and can make it dangerous to drink. Id.
260. See News Release, Methanex Corp., supra note 256 (explaining that
Methanex is a major supplier of methanol to MTBE producers in the United States
and elsewhere, but the only product that Methanex actually produces is methanol).
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- the principal ingredient of MTBE.261 On this basis, Methanex
contended that California's actions were both directly and indirectly
tantamount to expropriation where California's actions constituted a
"substantial interference and taking of the business of Methanex US
and Fortier, and a substantial interference and taking of Methanex's
investment in Methanex US and Fortier.
' 262
If the Methanex tribunal ever reaches the merits of Article 11 10,
the California ban may meet all of NAFTA's requirements (a non-
discriminatory action, for a public purpose, in accordance with due
process of law, and fair and equitable treatment), but that in itself
may not excuse the United States, on behalf of California, from
paying compensation if the tribunal interprets Article 1110 in an
expansive manner and deems the action expropriatory. 263 However,
such a ruling is not likely because the original complaint was
dismissed on grounds that the connection between Methanex's
operations and the MTBE ban was not the "legally significant"
connection that would be required satisfy the "relating to" language
in NAFTA, Article 1101.264
261. See News Release, PR Newswire, Methanex Closes Kitimat Methanol
Plant (July 4, 2000) (noting that the Kitimat Petrochemical Facility obtains
approximately $90 million annually in methanol export revenue), available at
http://www.findarticles.con/cf dls/m4PRN/2000_July_4/63106791/p 1/article.jhtm
I (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
262. Notice of Arbitration at 8, Methanex Corporation v. United States (Dec. 3,
1999) available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8773.pdf; see
also Dennis Pfaff, NAFTA Challenge to California, S.F. DAILY J., July, 1999
(discussing Methanex's June 15, 1999 notice of intent to submit a formal claim
filed with the U.S. State Department),
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/rulemakers/pfaff.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2004).
263. NAFTA, article 105 requires that the NAFTA Parties ensure that the
provisions of NAFTA are observed by state and provincial governments. However,
Section B of Chapter 11 provides only for "Settlement of Disputes Between a
Party and Investors of Another Party." Id. arts. 1115-22.
264. Methanex v. United States, Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction, Aug. 7,
2002, para. 147. See also Claimant Methanex Corporation's Second Amended
Statement of Claim, Methanex v. United States, para. 294 (asserting that
Methanex's principal argument in the continuing proceeding is based on a denial
of national treatment under Article 1102), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf. That is, California,
through its MTBE ban, sought to favor domestic producers of the competing
2004] 739
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Overall, and in contrast to decisions under Article 1105, the record
of NAFTA governments in defending expropriation claims is quite
good. The only finding of an Article 1110 violation was in
Metalclad, where there was a direct taking that eliminated the full
value of the firm's investment. 265 Despite expansive language in
several other decisions, there has been no finding of indirect
expropriation, partial taking, or government regulation that crosses
the line.266
B. PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
To date at least, the NAFTA Parties have not issued an
interpretation under Article 1131(2) that relates to expropriation. It is
unclear whether this is the result of a lack of sufficient concern, the
inability to agree on specific language, or a combination of the
two.2 6 7 The measured approach to critiquing the NAFTA taken by
Canadian and American officials emphasizes that the governments'
concerns are with improper interpretation of NAFTA provisions.
One American official has suggested, "[tihat promise [of NAFTA as
a model for the FTAA and other agreements], however, will only be
fulfilled if Chapter 11 tribunals are successful in distinguishing valid
claims under NAFTA and international law from claims beyond the
bounds of what the Parties believed they were agreeing to when they
gasoline additive, ethanol. Id. para. 298. California's actions, according to
Methanex, thus violated NAFTA Article 1102. Id.
265. As noted earlier in this section, the tribunal's finding of expropriation based
on a lack of transparency in the Mexican regulatory process was effectively
vacated by a British Columbia supreme court; the remaining ground for
expropriation, the conversion of Metalclad's property into an ecological preserve
- a direct taking - stands. See supra notes 245-250 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 220-254 and accompanying text (analyzing the decisions in
the cases of Feldman, Metalclad, S.D. Myers, Inc., Pope & Talbot, and Azinian).
267. See Brereton, supra note 77, at 13-14 (mentioning that as recently as May
2002, a Canadian government official stated that Canadian officials were
discussing a "clarification" and "will make recommendations to the Free Trade
Commission should circumstances require"); SANFORD E. GAINES, NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 AS A CHALLENGE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MAKING - ONE VIEW
FROM THE UNITED STATES 14 (2000) (noting that Canada requested Mexico and
the United States to develop a consensus to help tribunals interpret provisions in
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entered into the NAFTA. ' '268 A former Canadian trade minister
echoed this sentiment, noting that "[t]here is also room for the
NAFTA countries to make more explicit their understanding of the
Chapter 11 provisions related to expropriation and compensation...
[and] to ensure that the NAFTA expropriation provisions are
interpreted in a manner consistent with the original intent of the
parties. 269
Non-governmental organizations have more freely expressed their
criticisms of NAFTA. Environmental groups, for example, have been
highly critical of the repeated use of investor protection provisions
"to challenge the host country's environmental laws and
administrative decisions," noting that, "the provisions designed to
ensure security and predictability for the investors have created
uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental regulators. ' 270 For
some commentators, NAFTA's impact on restraining the
governments of Canada, the United States, and Mexico from issuing
effective regulations is most evident the environmental area, which
has been the focus of several major Chapter 11 cases. "[A]lthough
they dare not admit it publicly, environmental regulators are
increasingly less prepared to consider new regulatory efforts, as legal
analyses regularly suggest that they will be opening themselves to
potentially expensive claims under NAFTA's investment
provisions.
Additionally, during the debate on TPA, a letter written by the
Attorney General of California on behalf of the National Association
of State Attorneys General expressed "concern over the inclusion of
provisions in international trade agreements granting individual
foreign investors new rights to challenge and seek compensation for
state, local or federal government regulatory actions as
268. Clodfelter, supra note 24, at 1283.
269. Canada Seeks NAFTA Chapter 11, Improvements, Trade Minister Marchi
Says, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1634 (1999).
270. See Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Chapter 11 Provisions Said to Threaten
Environmental Protection Rights, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 1146 (1999) (quoting a
report released on June 22, 1999 by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development).
271. See Peter Manyasz, Regulatory Chill of NAFTA Chapter 11 To be Avoided
in FTAA, Lawyer Warns, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 626 (2001) (quoting Canadian trade
attorney Howard Mann).
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'expropriations.' ' 272 The letter further suggested that the TPA bill be
amended "to ensure that foreign investors receive no greater rights
than those afforded U.S. citizens made under our constitutional
guarantees."
273
Similar concerns surfaced in Chile, even prior to the Chile FTA
entering into force. One Chilean senator has complained that "[a]ny
change that we make, any new law that we approve, those who have
investments or are considering investing in Chile can take us to an
international court, as has happened with Mexico and Canada in
NAFTA, and make us pay many millions of dollars. 274
At the same time, business groups urged the U.S. government to
reject proposals that would narrow constraints on compensation for
expropriation, particularly by exempting "regulatory takings" from
compensation.275 Since 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that indirect or regulatory takings can constitute an expropriation for
which compensation is available. 276 Business groups also argued that
U.S. investors abroad should not receive less protection for their
investments than foreign investors enjoy under U.S. law.277
Given all of this discussion, the TPA language on expropriation is
relatively limited in scope. While the TPA language encourages the
establishment of "standards for expropriation and compensation for
272. Letter from Bill Lockyer, supra note 108.
273. Id.
274. See James Langman, Chilean Lawmaker Says Free Trade Accord with U.S.
Unconstitutional, Plans Challenge, 26 INT'L ENV'T REP. 1100 (2003) (noting the
intention of a Chilean lawmaker, Jorge Lavandaro, to file a complaint alleging that
the USCFTA is unconstitutional and will restrict the issuance of environmental
regulations).
275. See Letter from the presidents, supra note 106 at 2 (arguing that the mail
goal of the U.S. government should be the protection of investors).
276. See Marianne Tyrrell, Clarifying the Limits of Lucas: Reasserting the Value
of Government Police Power Through Land Planning Over Property-Rights
Interests in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
13 WIDENER L. J. 351, 353 (2003) (explaining that the theory of providing
compensation for regulatory takings originated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
277. See Letter from the presidents, supra note 106, at 2 (arguing that the Bush
administration should not "weaken the high standards of protection for investment
guaranteed in NAFTA Chapter 11").
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expropriation," these provisions must not afford foreign investors in
the United States greater substantive protection than U.S. investors in
the United States enjoy under "United States legal principles and
practices. 278 In order to maintain these standards, the TPA directs
the President to "establish standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal
principles and practice. 279
C. EXPROPRIATION PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - CHILE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
In fact, the expropriation provisions of the Chile FTA take into
account the concerns expressed by governments and environmental
groups regarding the distinction between compensable expropriation
and valid regulation to an extraordinary degree, not so much in the
text of the expropriation provision itself as in the explanatory
language contained in an annex. Arguably, the only possibly
significant textual change in the provision itself is the substitution of
the NAFTA phrase "equivalent to expropriation or nationalization"
for "tantamount to nationalization or expropriation," although this is
not a substantive change. It provides:
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a
non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; and (d)
in accordance with due process of law and Article 15.5.1, 15.5.2, and
15.5.3.28o
At least one NAFTA tribunal, S.D. Myers, suggested that the terms
"tantamount" and "equivalent" were functionally the same.28'
278. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(D) (2002); see also discussion supra Part IV.
279. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(D) (2002).
280. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.9. Article 15.6 of the Singapore FTA is
identical except for the cross-references to other articles. Singapore FTA, supra
note 1, art. 15.6
281. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
(Nov. 13, 2000)) (mentioning that the Oxford English dictionary lists "tantamount"
as meaning "equivalent").
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Moreover, the Spanish language version of the Chile FTA uses the
same phrase as the Spanish language version of NAFTA Article
1100, "equivalente a la expropiaci6n.'2 82 Thus, the significance of
this language change should not be over-emphasized. 283
The significant changes related to expropriation appear in Annex
10-D to the Chile FTA.284 This is a truly remarkable effort to provide
detailed guidance to future tribunals seeking to distinguish
282. See Tratado de Libre Comercio Chile - Estados Unidos, supra note 9, art.
10.9 (providing the Spanish language version of the Chile FTA).
283. See S.D. Myers, Inc., 40 I.L.M. at 1440 (noting that the tribunal should not
focus on technical considerations, but should instead examine the interests
involved and the purpose and effect of the government action at issue).
284. Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-D. "Expropriation" provides:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that:
1. Article 10.9(1) is intended to reflect customary international law
concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.
2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or
property interest in an investment.
3. Article 10.9(1) addresses two situations. The first is direct expropriation,
where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
4. The second situation addressed by Article 10.9(1) is indirect expropriation,
where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to
direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-
by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic
value of an investment standing alone, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) "Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.
Id. Annex 10-D is identical to the letter exchange on expropriation annexed to the
Singapore FTA, which "shall form an integral part of the Agreement." Singapore
FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.26(b).
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compensable expropriations from valid government regulations.215 It
unquestionably will make it more difficult for a foreign investor to
claim successfully that any sort of government regulatory action is an
expropriation, particularly if the regulatory action has any
environmental or public health nexus. First, Annex 10-D to the Chile
FTA confirms the intent of the Parties that Article 10.9 not go
beyond customary international law in its protection of investment.286
Secondly, it seeks to limit expropriation claims to interference with
tangible or intangible property rights.287 This would appear to be
designed to exclude from coverage some trade-based claims, perhaps
including those which were the subject of NAFTA claims in Pope &
Talbot and S.D. Myers. 88 Whether this will happen, given the
breadth of definitions of such terms as "investment" in Article 10.27,
remains to be seen.289
Third, indirect expropriation claims are highly circumscribed.
Paragraph four of the Chile FTA Appendix 10-D stresses the need
for "equivalency" of indirect takings to direct takings, absent only
the formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 29 ° The agreement
acknowledges that a case-by-case approach is necessary, but states
that an adverse effect of government actions on an investment itself
may be an indirect expropriation. An inquiry into whether
government interference is reasonable includes the extent of
government interference, the character of the government action, and
the government's investment-based expectations. 29' This language,
285. See CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, COMMENTS ON
THE CHILE AND SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2003) (mentioning that
replacing the phrase "tantamount to" with "shared understanding" in an annex of
the text provides guidance to arbitral panels that might limit expansive readings of
the expropriation provision), available at
http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/chile-sing-ciel.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
286. Id., para. 1.
287. Id., para. 2.
288. See discussion supra Part V-A.
289. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.27 (describing various forms of
investment, such as an enterprise, shares, stocks, and other forms of equity
participation in an enterprise, futures, options, other derivatives, and intellectual
property rights).
290. Annex 10-D, supra note 284, para. 4.
291. Annex 10-D, supra note 284, para. 4(a)(i)-(iii).
745
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
including the requirement of a case-by-case analysis, obviously
reflects U.S. takings law, specifically Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York.292
Perhaps most significantly under the Chile FTA, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions protecting "legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment" are not actionable as expropriations "except in rare
circumstances. '293 The tribunal's holding in Methanex resonates in
this provision, and it also reflects the Trade Promotion Act
objectives. As the USTR summary notes, "[p]ursuant to the
directives of the Trade Promotion Act of 2002, the article is
supplanted by an annex that elaborates on relevant principles of
United States takings law and clarifies the relationship of indirect
expropriations and domestic regulation. ' 294 The Chilean Ministry of
Finance also highlighted the clarification of the definition of indirect
expropriation in a presentation to the OECD.295
This language undoubtedly reflected current U.S. government
views as to the proper scope not only of Article 10.9 of the Chile
FTA, but also of Article 1110(1) of NAFTA, although it does not and
could not modify the latter. As one might have expected, the drafters
incorporated bracketed language substantially identical to the Chile
FTA Annex 10-D in the latest draft FTAA.296
292. 438 U.S. 104, 123-26 (1978) (indicating that the question of what
constitutes a "taking" is a "problem of particularly difficulty" and setting out a
framework for analysis adapted with minor variations in para. 4(a)(i)-(iii) of Annex
10-D of the Chile FTA).
293. Id., Annex 10-D para. 4(b).
294. USTR Summary, supra note 197, at 4.
295. See Republic of Chile Ministry of Finance, Investment and Transparency
Provisions in Chile's FTAs with the E.U. and U.S.A., Presentation before the
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Apr.
10, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Presentation] (comparing the NAFTA and Chile
FTA investor-state dispute provisions), available at
http://www.minhda.cl/castellano/contenido/otros/Doc-economicos/OECD-AprilO3
%20pres.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
296. See Third Draft Agreement, supra note 213, Annex 10 (reflecting the
parties' widely differing views as to investment protection provisions).
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VI. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
A. TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
Of course, the changes in the investment provisions in the Chile
FTA and Singapore FTA go beyond fair and equitable treatment and
expropriation.297 Among the most important evolutionary aspects of
this chapter is the language relating to transparency and public access
to the process. The relatively closed and secretive nature of the
NAFTA Chapter 11 process has been a continuing concern of
Canada and the United States, although this does not appear to be an
issue for Mexico. The problem stems not so much from what
NAFTA includes, but from what it excludes. Most significantly,
NAFTA does not require the publication of awards, let alone of the
pleadings, and there is no provision for public hearings.298 Where
Canada or the United States are respondent governments, either the
government or the disputing investor may make the award public. 99
In the case of Mexico, the "applicable arbitration rules" apply to
publication of the award.300 Under the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, "the Secretariat shall not publish the award without the
consent of the parties,""3 1 so that both effectively must agree. The
UNCITRAL Rules similarly state that an "award may be made
public only with the consent of both parties. 30 2
Over time, the Chapter 11 process has become somewhat more
transparent. Insofar as the author is aware, all major interim awards,
and all final awards, issued by NAFTA Chapter 11 have been made
297. See supra Parts IV & V.
298. NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1137.4.
299. See id. (outlining the procedures for making an award public if the
disputing party is Canada or the United States).
300. See id. (discussing the publication of the award when Mexico is the
disputing party).
301. INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID
ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES art. 53(3) (2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
302. U.N. COMMISSION ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES art. 32(5) (1976), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.rules.1976/32
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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available to the public. 03 There do appear to be some minor or
dormant cases in which the Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration has never been made public.3 4
NAFTA's opponents have focused on the lack of transparency of
Chapter 11 proceedings. For example, Public Citizen has denounced
NAFTA Chapter 11 in part because "closed-door arbitral bodies [are]
dealing with significant issues of public policy."30 5 The broadside
continued:
Indeed, there is no requirement that the public or Congress be given
notice that a NAFTA Chapter 11 case has been filed against the United
States, raising the specter that in addition to the cases we have been able
to unearth, perhaps more cases have been filed and either have been
quietly settled through negotiated payments or are still pending.
30 6
The first significant effort of the NAFTA governments to deal
with this problem occurred with the July 2001 release of the "Notes
of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions," stating that:
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the
disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the
application of Article 1137(4) [referring to the Annex 1137.4 above-
303. See generally NAFTALAW.ORG, NAFTALAW.ORG,
http://www.naftalaw.org(last visited Apr. 9, 2004). It is worth noting, however,
that none of the NAFTA government websites are as transparent as the private
NAFTALAW.org.
304. NAFTALAW.ORG, The Disputes: Canada (displaying NAFTA disputes
involving Canada and listing the legal documents that have been made public, and
specifically noting the failure to post the notice of intent to file an arbitration claim
in Singa, S.A. v. Canada), at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004);
see also NAFTALAW.ORG, The Disputes: Mexico (displaying NAFTA disputes
involving Mexico and listing the legal documents that have been made public, and
specifically noting the failure to post the notice of intent to file an arbitration claim
in Halchette Corp. v. Mexico), at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
305. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 1 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES:
BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY 2-3 (2001) (using the lack of transparency as a basis
to attack NAFTA's investor protections and arguing against the use of "Fast
Track" for development of the proposed FTAA on the ground that this process
obscures meaningful analysis of a proposed agreement's binding terms and the
terms' legal, public health, and environmental implications), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF 186.PDF (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
306. Id. at 2.
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mentioned publication of award provision], nothing in the NAFTA
precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents
submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven Tribunal.3 °7
The Congress, in enacting TPA, clearly indicated its belief that
more transparency was appropriate. In the Trade Negotiating
Objectives,3"' Congress directed the President to "ensur[e] that all
requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public" along with
submissions, findings, and decisions; to ensure that "all hearings are
open to the public;" and to establish "a mechanism for acceptance of
amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions and non-
governmental organizations. 3 9
Prompted by the Trade Negotiating Objectives and the negotiation
of the Singapore and Chile FTAs, the United States and Canada
issued statements in October 2003 indicating that they would consent
to NAFTA Chapter 11 hearings that were open to the public, so long
as the hearings were subject to measures to protect confidential
information, including confidential business information.310 At the
same time, the NAFTA Parties issued a statement requesting non-
disputing party participation in Chapter 11 proceedings, similar to an
307. See INTERPRETATION, supra note 29, Part A. In addition to this statement of
principle, the Parties agreed "to make available to the public in a timely manner all
documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal.. ." subject to
redaction of privileged or confidential business information, or to the withholding
of information that falls under NAFTA articles 2102 and 2105, protecting,
respectively, national security or privacy. Id. at A.2.b, A.3.
308. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text (discussing why Congress
enacted TPA and how it incorporated the concerns of competing interest groups
when drafting the Trade Negotiating Objectives).
309. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(H)(iii) (2002).
310. See Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Open Hearings in
NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (Oct. 7, 2003) (proclaiming that the United
States will consent to open hearings in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes to which it is a
party and recommends that tribunals consult with disputing parties to determine
appropriate logistical arrangements for these hearings), available at
http://www.ustr.gov;/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003/statement-openhearings.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade,
Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations
(affirming Canada's consent to NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes to which it is a party
being open to the public), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/open-hearing-
en.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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amicus brief.31 It remains to be seen how NAFTA will implement
these procedural changes. As of the beginning of 2004, only one
case, a jurisdictional hearing in UPS v. Canada, has been open to the
public, 1 2 but it can be expected that many others will follow.
The Singapore and Chile FTAs reflect a faithful adherence by the
USTR to the Trade Negotiating Objectives in this area. According to
the USTR:
The provisions [on transparency] ensure that the proceedings are
transparent by requiring that all documents submitted to or issued by a
tribunal be available to the public, except for certain business proprietary
and other confidential information, and requiring that the proceedings be
open to the public. The public is also able to give its views on the
proceedings through a provision expressly enabling the tribunal to accept
amicus curiae submissions.
31 3
311. See Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on
Non-disputing Party Participation (stating that NAFTA tribunals have the
discretion to accept written submissions from non-disputing parties and outlining
the procedures for non-disputing parties to file submissions with a tribunal),
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003/statement-
nondisputingparties.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Press Release, Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Commission Meets, Announces New
Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003) (announcing the Free Trade Commission's
measures to enhance public participation in the Chapter 11 dispute process,
including the affirmation of the authority of tribunals to accept amicus curiae
briefs, the endorsement of a standard Notice of Intent from to initiate arbitration,
and the consent of the United States and Canada to opening Chapter 11 hearings to
the public), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/l0/03-65.pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004).
312. See Press Release, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
United Parcel Service of American, Inc. v. Government of Canada
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding (Jul. 25, 2002) (stating that the
parties in the UPS v. Canada NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute have agreed to make the
hearing on the objections to jurisdiction open to the public),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Email from
Meg Kinnear, Esq., Canadian Department Dep't of Foreign Affairs and
International Int'l Trade, to David Gantz (Nov. 26, 2003) (confirming her belief
that the UPS hearing was the only public Chapter 11 hearing to date) (on file with
author).
313. USTR Summary, supra note 197, at 6.
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In a presentation to the OECD, Chile noted the greater
transparency provisions, including the acceptance of amicus curiae
submissions and public hearings.
3 14
The Chile FTA requires that the notices of intent and arbitration,
pleadings, memorials and briefs, minutes or transcripts of hearings of
the tribunal, orders, awards, and decisions, all be made public.3 15
Likewise, hearings are to be opened to the public.3 1 6 The agreement,
however, does include suitable restrictions for protection of
privileged or confidential business information.3 17 The transparency
provisions of the Singapore FTA are virtually identical.31 8 The Chile
FTA also gives the tribunal the authority, "to accept and consider
amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a
disputing party." '319 The Singapore FTA only slightly narrows this
scope, granting tribunals "the authority to accept and consider
amicus curiae submissions from any persons and entities in the
territories of the Parties and from interested persons and entities
outside the territories of the Parties.3 20 These changes are indeed a
significant departure from the traditional veil of secrecy that
normally surrounds investor-state arbitration.32" ' The effect of a more
open and transparent set of procedures on the public is difficult to
predict with certainty, but one can speculate that public attendance
314. See OECD Presentation, supra note 305, at 18 (comparing the transparency
provisions between NAFTA and the Chile FTA).
315. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.20(1).
316. See id. art. 10.20(2) (requiring the tribunal to make hearings open to the
public and to consult with the disputing parties to determine the appropriate
logistical arrangements).
317. See id. (stating that a disputing party that intends to use privileged or
confidential information must advise the tribunal and the tribunal must make
appropriate arrangements to protect the information from disclosure).
318. Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.20(1)-(2).
319. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(4)(3).
320. Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.19(3).
321. See, e.g., INT'L CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE INSTITUTION OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS, R. 32(2) ("The Tribunal shall, decide, with the consent of the
parties, which other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and
advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the
Tribunal may attend the hearings.").
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will peak early and decrease dramatically once it becomes clear that
the level of excitement is normally quite low!3
22
B. OTHER DIFFERENCES IN PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
There are a number of other changes in the Chile FTA, compared
to NAFTA, which are mostly procedural or jurisdictional. These may
be significant in expanding or restricting a U.S. foreign investor's
recourse to international arbitration.3 23 At the outset, it is notable that,
while the specific options for arbitration (ICSID, ICSID Additional
Facility, and UNCITRAL Rules) are the same under NAFTA, the
Chile FTA, and the Singapore FTA, the available options are greater,
because Chile and Singapore, unlike Mexico and Canada, are parties
to the ICSID Convention.
3 24
1. Explicit Coverage of Investment Authorizations and Agreements
The scope of the arbitration provisions in the Chile FTA (and the
Singapore FTA) were explicitly expanded to include allegations of a
breach of "an investment authorization" or "an investment
agreement," in addition to a general breach of the obligations set out
in Annex A of the investment chapter.325 References to "investment
322. Speaking as a former arbitrator in several closed NAFTA arbitral hearings.
323. See id. (explaining that, under the Chile FTA, if an investor has submitted a
claim to a court or administrative tribunal in Chile, the investor may not submit the
claim to international arbitration). This provision is not included in the US-
Singapore agreement. Id.
324. Int'l Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting
States and Other Signatories of the Convention (stating that Chile became a party
on Oct. 24,1991, and that Singapore became a party on Nov. 13, 1968,) available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
325. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.15(1) (using the definitions from Art.
article 10.27, which defines "investment agreement" as "a written agreement that
takes effect at least two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement
between a national authority of a Party and a covered investment of an investor of
the other Party: (a) that grants rights with respect to natural resources or other
assets that a national authority controls; and (b) that the covered investment or the
investor relies on in establishing or acquiring a covered investment."). An
"investment authorization" is "an authorization that the foreign investment
authority of a Party grants to a covered investment or an investor of the other
Party." Id. art 10.27. See Singapore FTA, supra note 1, arts. 15.15(1) and 15.1
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authorizations" or "investment agreements" are absent in Chapter 11,
but are found in standard U.S. bilateral investment treaties. 326 These
additions resulted in an expansion of the NAFTA's governing law
clauses.327 In the Chile FTA, claims under the general provisions of
section A and Annex 10-F of Chapter 10 are subject to this the same
governing language.328 However, where the claim is based on an
investment agreement or investment authorization, "the tribunal must
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with the rules of law
specified in the pertinent investment agreement or investment
authorization, or as the disputing parties may agree. '329 "If the rules
of law were not specified or otherwise agreed to, the tribunal must
apply the law of the respondent (including its rules on the conflict of
laws), the terms of the investment agreement or investment
(specifying the disputes which the claimant may submit to arbitration, including an
investment authorization and an investment agreement).
326. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
Treaty, Aug. 27, 1993, art. VI, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-15 (defining an
investment dispute as a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the
other Party arising out of or relating to: an investment agreement between the Party
and such national or company, an investment authorization granted by the Party's
foreign investment authority to such national or company, or an alleged breach of
any right conferred or created by the treaty with respect to an investment),
http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/usecu-e.asp
327. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(1) (stipulating that "a Tribunal shall
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules
of international law").
328. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-F, para. 2 (requiring Chile to
accord the benefits of Chapter 10 to investors who have concluded investment
contracts in Chile under the Estatuto de la Inversion Extranjera, Decreto Ley 600
de 1974 (DL 600), i.e., "to amend the investment contract to make it consistent
with Chile's obligations under this Agreement"). The investor is guaranteed the
better of the treatment available under the Agreement or under the investment
contract. Id. para. 1; see also Chile Investment Review, INT'L PRESS SELECTIONS,
June 2002, at 11 (according to the Chilean Government, Foreign Investment
Committee, DL 600 investments represent "a very high percentage of total U.S.
investments in Chile"), available at
http://www.chile.or.jp/oficom/foreign/Investment%2OReview%2OJune%
2 02 0 0 2 .p
df (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). According to the report, between January and April
of 2002, Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") in Chile reached $679 million,
seventy-eight percent of which was channeled through the DL 600. Id. During
those months, FDI came primarily from the U.S. (31.5%). Id.
329. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(2).
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authorization, such rules of or international laws as may be
applicable, and this Agreement."33 0 The Singapore FTA, in contrast,
essentially mirrors the NAFTA choice of law language.33'
In both the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA, as in NAFTA, "[a]
decision of the [Free Trade] Commission declaring its interpretation
of a provision of this Agreement... shall be binding on a tribunal
established under this Section, and any award must be consistent
with that decision."'332 The italicized portion was likely added to both
new agreements to avoid the types of questions raised by NAFTA
tribunals in arbitrations such as Pope & Talbot, which had
questioned whether a subsequently issued Interpretation was binding
even on a tribunal whose case remained pending, and thought it
appropriate to opine on whether the Interpretation was justified under
the NAFTA language or was actually an ultra vires effort to amend
NAFTA.333 Under the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA, the tribunal
must adhere to the Commission's decision.
334
The incorporation of investment agreements and investment
authorizations led to other departures from NAFTA in the Chile
FTA, which nevertheless resemble language in older bilateral
investment treaties. A tribunal's obligation to determine a claim
based on an investment agreement, as discussed earlier, complicates
the choice of law issues. Under NAFTA, the applicable law is the
agreement itself or international law.336 Under the Chile FTA, as
quoted above, the tribunal may be required to apply the law of the
330. See id.
331. See Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.21.
332. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(3); Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art.
15.21(2); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2).
333. See discussion supra Part IV.
334. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(3); accord, Singapore FTA, supra note
1, art. 15.21(2).
335. See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text (explaining the expansion
of the governing law clauses in the Chile FTA). When the claim is based on an
investment agreement or investment authorization, the tribunal must decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with the specified rules of law or as the disputing
parties may agree. Id.
336. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1130 (establishing the governing law for all
investment disputes arising under the treaty).
[19: 679
2004] THE EVOLUTION OF FTA INVESTMENT PRO VISIONS 755
investment agreement, which is often the national law of the host
country.337
2. Parallel Actions and the "Fork in the Road"
Both NAFTA and the Chile FTA establish, as a general rule, a
requirement that a claimant seeking to avail herself of the arbitration
provisions of the investment chapter must waive, as a condition
precedent, any existing or future recourse to national courts or
administrative tribunals for the same dispute,338 subject to an
exception for injunctive relief not involving monetary damages.339
The Singapore FTA contains language on this exception that is
virtually identical to that in the Chile FTA.34° These provisions are
termed "no-U-turn" provisions,34" ' because once the claimant
abandons an existing national court action and then files a claim
under Chapter 11, the claimant cannot return to the local courts,
except where injunctive relief is at issue.342 NAFTA treats Mexico
differently, in part because it is the only NAFTA party that permits
direct domestic court actions in domestic courts explicitly based on
NAFTA violations. For Mexico, a foreign national claimant may
337. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.21(2).
338. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(1) (referring to claims brought by both
the investor, and an enterprise of another Party that the investor owns or controls
directly or indirectly); see also Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 110.117(2)
(stipulating that the claimant's consent to arbitration and waiver of the mentioned
rights must be put in writing).
339. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(1) (excepting "proceedings for
injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief'); see also Chile FTA, supra
note 1, art. 11.17(3) (referring to an action seeking "interim injunctive relief' that
"does not involve the payment of monetary damages," with the further proviso that
"the action is brought for the sole purpose of preserving the claimant's or the
enterprises' rights and interests during the pendency of the arbitration").
340. See Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.17(3).
341. See Clodfelter, supra note 24, at 1279 (distinguishing these provisions from
"fork-in-the-road" provisions normally found in bilateral investment treaties,
which state that once an investor has begun either domestic procedures or investor-
state arbitration, she may not switch to the other).
342. See id. at 1279 n.1 (explaining that Chapter 1 1's "no u-turn" provisions
apply to all three NAFTA parties, except that under a special annex, in certain
respects they do not apply to claims for violations of NAFTA standards brought
against Mexico).
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allege a violation of Section A of Chapter 11 in a local court or
administrative tribunal, or in a NAFTA tribunal, but not both.343
The Chile FTA language provides that no claim may be submitted
to arbitration under Chapter 10 unless the notice of arbitration
contains a written waiver "of any right to initiate or continue before
any administrative tribunal or court under the law of either Party, or
other dispute settlement procedures, any proceeding with respect to
the events alleged to give rise to the claimed breach." '344 The
Singapore FTA contains the same language. 45 Both NAFTA and the
Chile FTA contemplate "interim measures" by the tribunal in
identical language, but the relief under the Chile FTA and Singapore
FTA is explicitly limited to preserving the rights of a disputing party,
evidence in the possession or control of the disputing parties, or the
tribunal's jurisdiction.346  Significantly, tribunals cannot order
attachments or enjoin applications of measures alleged to be
breaches of the substantive obligations of the investment chapters.
In the Chile FTA, however, there is a full "fork in the road"
provision applicable only to Chile, which also resembles NAFTA's
Annex 1120.1, and is operationally similar to those in U.S. and other
BITs.347 The Chile FTA's provision is more detailed and explicit in
343. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1120.1 (applying this stipulation to
allegations of breaches of Subchapter A; or Article 1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and
State Enterprises) or Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises) where the alleged breach
pertains to the obligations of Subchapter A). If a Mexican firm owned or controlled
by a foreign investor alleges a breach of Section A in a local court or
administrative tribunal, "the investor may not allege the breach in an arbitration
under this Section." Id.
344. Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.17(2).
345. Singapore FTA, supra notel, art. 15.17(2).
346. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1133 (including expansive language
"such measures may include, but are not limited to" when referring to possible
interim measures), with Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(8), and Singapore
FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.19(8) (excluding the expansive language incorporated in
the NAFTA article).
347. See, e.g., Ronald S. Lauder and the Czech Republic, ("Final Award" Sept.
3, 2001) (litigating under the BIT between the United States and the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment), at
http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/FinalAward.doc (last visited Feb. 10, 2004);
Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, 40 I.L.M. 457, 458 ("Preliminary Decision
on Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal" Dec. 8, 1998) (litigating under the BIT
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requiring an election between the local courts and international
arbitration under Chapter 10.348 There is no parallel to this provision
in the Singapore FTA.3 49 This language was presumably included
because Chile, like Mexico, but unlike the United States, would
permit consideration of a claim alleging breach of Chapter 10
provisions by the local courts or administrative agencies. Where an
American investor in Chile is operating under the general protections
of Section A or under Annex 10-F, the investor may not seek
arbitration under Chapter 10 if she has already alleged the breach of
section A or Annex 10-F before a national court or administrative
tribunal.350 Also, a claim alleging a breach of an investment
agreement or investment authorization before a court or
administrative tribunal bars later recourse to arbitration.351
The election by the U.S. investor to submit the matter to the
Chilean court or administrative tribunal is "definitive and the
investor may not thereafter submit the claim to arbitration under
Section B."352 It is unclear what happens if the same substantive
claim were to be raised in Chilean court charging violations of
Chilean law which, if true, would be in violation of the FTA
provisions (but not explicitly charging violation of Chapter 10), and
between the United States and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment); CMS Gas Transmission Co. and
Arg., 42 I.L.M. 788, 789 ("Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction"
July 17, 2003) (litigating under the BIT between the United States and the
Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Arg.
(Annulment Committee) (Jul. 3, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1135, 1137 ("Decision on
Annulment" July 3, 2002) (litigating under the France-Argentina BIT).
348. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-E (setting forth rules for the
submission of claims to arbitration).
349. See generally Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.15 (setting forth the
requirements for a submission of a claim to arbitration, which do no include a
requirement that parties elect between local courts and international arbitration).
350. See id. Annex 10-E, para. 1(a), "Submission of a Claim to Arbitration -
Chile" (indicating that the bar to arbitration arises when the American investor
brings a claim in a court or administrative tribunal of Chile). By its explicit title
and terms, the Annex applies only to actions in Chile, not to reciprocal situations
involving a Chilean investor in the United States.
351. See id. Annex 10-E, para. l(b) (noting that an American investor is also
barred from submitting a claim under Section B of the Chile FTA).
352. Id. Annex 10-E, para. 2.
2004]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
also in an FTA investment arbitration charging violations of Chile's
Chapter 10, Section A, obligations. This "fork in the road" provision,
here and in the various bilateral investment treaties, is a significant
narrowing of the investor's options, compared to the waiver
approach, in that the waiver contemplates (through use of the word
"continue") the discontinuance of already filed national court
actions, while Annex 10-E requires an election.353 Except for interim
injunctive relief, once an action is filed in the national courts or
administrative tribunals that choice is final - no waiver is possible.354
It thus may compel a choice of forum decision at the outset of the
dispute, at a time when the seriousness of the dispute may not be
fully apparent to the investor.355
3. Requiring Jurisdictional and Competence Issues to be Decided at
the Outset
Another significant innovation in the Chile FTA and Singapore
FTA, compared to NAFTA, is an effort to force tribunals to decide
jurisdictional issues at the outset of the dispute, rather than joining
them to the merits. This innovation reflects language in the Trade
Negotiating Objectives to incorporate "mechanisms to eliminate
frivolous claims and to deter the filing of frivolous claims. 356
Presumably, this reflected concerns of the United States (and,
probably, the other NAFTA governments), of being required to
defend claims on the merits that the governments believe should
have been dismissed on procedural grounds. 7 While some cases
353. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.17 (requiring parties to accompany
claims for arbitration with waivers "of any right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of either Party... any proceeding
with respect to the events alleged to give rise to the claimed breach").
354. See id. art. 10.17(3) (reserving the right of parties to initiate or continue an
action for injunctive relief "provided that the action is brought for the sole purpose
of preserving the claimant's or enterprise's rights and interests during the
pendency of the arbitration" even if the party then elects to submit a claim for FTA
arbitration).
355. See id. (suggesting that a party may seek injunctive relief, without a risk of
limiting decisions on the choice of forum).
356. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(ii) (2002).
357. See, e.g., Objection to Jurisdiction of Respondent United States of
America, Canfor Corp. v. United States, at 32-34 (NAFTA Trib. 32 (Oct. 16,
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have been dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds, many
others have resulted in decisions on the merits, or combining
procedure and the merits, even if the governments ultimately
prevailed.358 There is at most, only one case decided under Chapter
11 that could reasonably be classified as frivolous, Pope & Talbot.
This proceeding against Canada stretched on for almost four years,
with five major decisions, numerous orders, and multiple hearings,
and resulted in an award on the merits of only one peripheral claim
of less than $500,000, with costs and attorneys' fee exceeding $7.5
million.359 However, that tribunal did consider many questions
relating to the scope of Chapter 11 provisions which had not been
addressed previously.
In any event, the Chile FTA incorporates a mandatory procedure
for dealing with preliminary competence and jurisdictional issues:
Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other objections as a
preliminary question, such as an objection that a dispute is not within a
tribunal's competence, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary
question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim
2003)) (arguing that the NAFTA tribunal should consider the jurisdictional issue as
a preliminary matter before addressing the merits of the dispute), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/25567.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2004).
358. See, e.g., Azinian v. United Mexican States, 39 I.L.M. 537, 556 (2000)
(ICSID (W. Bank) Nov. 1, 1999) (holding in favor of respondent United Mexican
States but deciding not to award costs); see also ADF Group, Inc. v. United States,
para. 9 (ICSID (W. Bank) Jan. 9, 2003) (holding in favor of the United States but
rejecting the request for an award for costs); see also Mondev v. United States, 42
I.L.M. 85, 115-16 (2003) (ICSID (W. Bank) Oct. 11, 2002) (holding in favor of the
United States but rejecting its request that petitioner Mondev pay costs and legal
expenses on the basis that Mondev's claim was "unmeritorious and should never
have been brought").
359. See David A. Gantz, International Decisions: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration Tribunal, 2000-2002, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
937, 937-38 (2003) (noting that Pope & Talbot valued its claims at approximately
$509 million). See generally Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, Canfor
Corp. v. United States, (NAFTA Trib. 18 (Jul. 9, 2003)) (setting forth the
claimant's charges that the United States' imposition of antidumping and
countervailing duties on U.S. imports of softwood lumber constitute violations of
various obligations under NAFTA, Chapter 11, Section A), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13203.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
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submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may
be made under Article 10.25.360
Once the respondent government submits an objection to
jurisdiction, the tribunal is required to suspend any proceedings on
the merits, and decide the competence issue.361 Where a request is
made for decision on an expedited basis, a decision on the objection
or objections must be issued within 150 days of the request (160 if
there is a hearing, 180 if the tribunal shows "extraordinary cause").362
The Chile FTA authorizes the tribunal "to award to the prevailing
disputing party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in
submitting or opposing the objection. 3 63 "In determining whether
such an award is warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether either
the claimant's claim or the respondent's objection was frivolous, and
shall provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to
comment."3"
Under the ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, and UNCITRAL
Arbitral Rules, the tribunals have relatively broad discretion in
awarding costs and attorneys' fees.3 65 Thus, the inclusion of this
360. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(4) (referring to art. 10.25
"Awards"); see also Singapore FTA, supra note 1, art. 15.19(4) (incorporating
language similar to art. 10.19(4) of the Chile FTA).
361. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, art. 10.19(4) (noting also that a party does not
waive an objection as to competence merely because the party did or did not raise
it under this section).
362. See id., arts. 10.19(4)-(5) (allowing the tribunal to delay the issuance of a
decision to 160 days if there is a hearing and 180 days if the tribunal shows
extraordinary cause).
363. Id. art. 10.19(6).
364. Id.
365. See ICSID ARB. R. 28 (permitting the tribunal, "unless otherwise agreed by
the parties" to decide "the portion which each party shall pay... of the fees and
expenses of the Tribunal and the charges for use of the facilities of the Centre. .. "),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF-chap03.htm#r28 (last visited Feb.
10, 2004). There is also a reference to "costs reasonably incurred or borne by [each
party] in the proceeding..." Id.; see also ICSID ARBITRATION (ADDITIONAL
FACILITY) R. 58 (providing that "unless the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal
shall decided how and by whom the fees and expenses of the members of the
Tribunal, the expenses and charges of the Secretariat and the expenses incurred by
the parties in connection with the proceeding shall be borne"),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/partD-chap10.htm#a58 (last visited Feb.
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language presumably is designed to discourage frivolous claims,
although it could apply equally to a respondent government raising
frivolous objections.366 It seems intended to encourage tribunals to
support this objective when exercising their discretion over costs and
attorneys' fees, as the U.S. Congress intended to accomplish with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure many decades ago.
3 67
10, 2004); UNCITRAL ARB. R., art. 38(e) (illustrating that unlike the ICSID rules,
these rules specifically mention the "costs of legal representation and assistance"
along with other costs), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.rules.1976/38 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2004). The tribunal had discretion here, as under ICSID, as to how
to determine or apportion those costs. Id.
366. See UNCITRAL ARB. R., art. 38(e) (permitting the arbitral tribunal to
include in an award costs of legal representation of the successful party, regardless
of whether the successful party is a claimant, respondent, government, or private
entity).
367. See Marguerite L. Butler, Rule 11- Sanctions and a Lawyer's Failure to
Conduct Competent Legal Research, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 681, 687-88 (2002)
(explaining that one motivation behind the adoption of Rule 11 is to prevent
litigants from wasting court resources in filing frivolous claims); see also
Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007,
1037-43 (1999) (questioning whether the rule is actually successful in deterring
frivolous claims). Rule 11 states:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11
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4. Consideration of Appellate Review Mechanism
Finally, it is notable that the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA reflect
the possibility, at least, of establishing some sort of appellate
mechanism to review arbitral awards under the agreements.3 68 Thus,
in the Chile FTA, "[w]ithin three years after the date of entry into
force of this Agreement, the Parties shall consider whether to
establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review
awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations commenced after
they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism. '3 69 This
language, again, reflects a phrase in TPA legislation calling for, in
future trade agreements, "an appellate body or similar mechanism to
provide coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions in
trade agreements. 37 °
There is no such mechanism applicable to NAFTA. Rather, review
of arbitral decisions under NAFTA are subject to the hit or miss
proposition of an action to "revise, set aside or annul the award" in
the courts of the place or "situs" of the arbitration.3 71 To date, there
have been three challenges to NAFTA arbitral decisions, all in
Canadian courts. As noted earlier a British Columbia Supreme Court
partially setting aside the arbitral decision in Metalclad.3 72 Reviewing
courts in Ontario have affirmed the NAFTA tribunal decisions in
368. See Letter from George Yeo on the Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate
Mechanism, Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore, to Robert Zoellick, U.S.
Trade Representative (May 6, 2003) (agreeing that the future establishment of an
appellate body will be "treated as an integral part of the agreement"), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta1Singapore/final/15app.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
369. Chile FTA, supra note 1, Annex 10-H.
370. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv)(4) (2002).
371. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(3)(b)(i); see also Guillermo Aguilar
Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 374-75 (2003) (explaining that although Rule
52 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides for review by an ICSID "Annulment
Committee," these rules are not available for use by the NAFTA Parties because
neither Mexico nor Canada are parties to the ICSID Convention). The authors also
discuss the review process, with particular focus on Metalclad.
372. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. [2001] B.C.L.R. 359,
discussed infra Part V.A.
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S.D. Myers and Feldman.373 Given that these reviews are taking
place before different courts in the same country, under possibly
different standards of review, and will likely occur in other courts in
other countries in the future, the desirability of a more consistent
review mechanism is obvious, even if creating a mutually agreeable
one may be difficult.374 The language in the Chile FTA and
Singapore FTA is thus a useful first step in the right direction,
although it may make more sense to create a multilateral review
mechanism in lieu of a separate mechanism for each FTA negotiated
by the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
If one seeks to ascertain the views of the United States
Government regarding the interpretation of Chapter 11, by NAFTA
tribunals, one needs to look no further than the parallel provisions of
the Chile FTA, and the very similar Singapore FTA. The precise
373. See Canada v. S.D. Myers, [2004] FC 38, para. 42 (Can.) (rejecting a
jurisdictional challenge based on Canada's allegation that there was no
"investment" by S.D. Myers, in a very formalistic approach, and holding that
Canada effectively waived its right to submit the issue as "jurisdictional" challenge
by failing to label it as such), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/ ReasonsforOrder.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2004). The federal court
sitting in Ontario also concluded that Canadian law does not permit judicial review
of an arbitral decision if the decision is based on an error of law or an erroneous
finding of fact, if the arbitral decision itself is within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal." Id.; see also United Mexican States v. Feldman, No. 03-CV-23500 at
paras. 77, 87 (Sup. Ct. Ontario Dec. 3, 2003) (dismissing the challenge to the
NAFTA tribunal, and affording the tribunal a high degree of deference: "In my
view, a high level of deference should be accorded to the Tribunal, especially in
cases where the Appellant Mexico is in reality challenging a finding of fact. The
panel who has heard the evidence is best able to determine issues or credibility,
reliability and onus of proof') (on file with author). The court also indicated that
the public policy exception to enforcement should be invoked only when the award
"must fundamentally offend the most basic and explicit principles of justice and
fairness in Ontario, or evidence intolerable ignorance or corruption on the part of
the arbitral Tribunal." Id. The Mexican government has appealed this decision.
374. See William S. Dodge, International Decision: Metalclad Corporation v.
Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 918-19 (2001) (suggesting the need for an
appellate body to review NAFTA Chapter 11 awards and urging that the
establishment of an appellate review mechanism for NAFTA Chapter 11 cases has
additional benefits, including neutrality in review of awards and an opportunity for
review by a trier of fact with greater expertise on questions of international law
than typically found in municipal courts).
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impact of these changes must necessarily await a decision or two
under these agreements or others negotiated with similar provisions,
a legal process which is likely to require several years. Nevertheless,
one can predict with reasonable confidence that the tribunals
convened under these agreements will treat some key issues
differently from the way in which at least some tribunals have treated
them under NAFTA Chapter 11.
There is no doubt that the United States government intended to
weaken investor protection in the Chile FTA, Singapore FTA, and
subsequent FTAs and BITs with similar investment protections. The
concern was with Congress, public critics and possible future foreign
investor actions against the United States, far more than with the
need to protect U.S. investors abroad, even though the likelihood of
actions against the United States by investors of these nations is
miniscule compared to the very real risks for U.S. investors in some
of those states. As the Environmental Review of the U.S.-Chile FTA
states:
In our view, these provisions [in the FTA's investment chapter] are
significant improvements and further reduce the possibility of a
successful challenge under the investment provisions to an environmental
law or regulation. These provisions should help alleviate public concerns
with some arbitral proceedings that have been brought under the
investment provisions of the NAFTA and concerns that arbitral tribunals
may adopt interpretations that go beyond the substantive rights contained
under U.S. law.
375
The Chile FTA and Singapore FTA, and others that have
incorporated similar provisions,376 are, not surprisingly, unpopular
with the business community. Their representatives recently
complained that "adapting the model BIT to the investment chapters
of recent FTAs serves only to perpetuate a downward trend in
protection for U.S. investors, while their European competitors
375. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW OF THE U.S. - CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (Jun. 2003), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/environment/tpa/chile-environment.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2004).
376. See supra notes 208-219 and accompanying text.
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continue to benefit from BITs that now set the standard for investor
protection.
3 77
How are these controversial new provisions likely to affect
investment' arbitrations? First, they are likely to limit violations of
fair and equitable treatment to the relatively high standard imposed
by customary international law, but a customary international law
that reflects evolution, including the influence of a large body of
BITs, and the growing jurisprudence of arbitral decisions rendered
under Chapter 11 and the bilateral BITs.378 Secondly, when
reviewing alleged expropriations based on government regulatory
action, such tribunals are likely to impose a high burden of proof to
overcome the strong presumption in the annexes that regulatory
actions are not expropriatory.37 9 It will be particularly interesting to
see whether foreign governments, and their creative attorneys, are
tempted to use Annex 10-D of the Chile FTA (excluding most
regulatory actions from treatment as indirect expropriation), as a
virtual roadmap to uncompensated regulatory takings.
More generally, arbitral tribunals appointed under these new FTA
and BIT provisions may face the need to consider and analyze the
U.S. (and other national) legal principles incorporated in minimum
standard of treatment and expropriation provisions, even though the
377. Report of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy
Regarding the Draft Modeal Bilateral Investment Treaty at 2 (Feb. 11, 2004)
(nothing that the investor representatives on the Advisory Committee favored the
1994 BIT with provisions similar to those in NAFTA Chapter 11, and opining that
"The 1994 model BIT offers strong protections against the substantial risks that
face U.S. investors abroad, as demonstrated by ten years of case law, and it
continues to reflect modem international law and investment practice") (on file
with author). The Report reflects that fact that members of environmental and
labor organizations have considerably different views, believing that "even with
the new provisions, the draft model BIT fails to protect adequately the authority of
governments to adopt and maintain measures that protect important public
interests." Id.
378. See Chile FTA, supra note 1, arts. 10.4(1)-(2) (adopting the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment as the minimum standard of
treatment afforded to covered investments to ensure fair and equitable treatment as
limited in that provision).
379. This is particularly true with regard to the Chile FTA, Annex 10-D(4)(b)
(stating that "except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives ... do not constitute indirect expropriations").
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governing law remains the agreement and international law. Further,
there remains an inherent conflict between the effort to limit the
protection of an investor (in the United States) to what is provided
under domestic law- extensive though that protection may be-and
the parallel effort to maintain that foreign investors world-wide are
subject to minimum standards established under customary
international law.
It will also be interesting to see whether claimants in future
NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings (or in proceedings under bilateral
investment treaties) cite the Chile FTA and Singapore FTA language
to support their own views of NAFTA's scope, effectively arguing
that if the NAFTA parties had meant what is said in the Chile FTA
provisions, that is what they would have said in NAFTA. Since
neither customary international law, nor fair and equitable treatment,
nor regulatory takings, are defined under either NAFTA nor most
existing bilateral investment treaties, it seems likely that the language
of Annex 10-A of the Chile FTA (defining "customary international
law) and Annex 10-D (on expropriation and regulatory takings) will
be cited as support for the conclusion that NAFTA's protections for
foreign investors are broader than those afforded in the Chile and
Singapore agreements, and should be interpreted as such to favor the
interests of foreign investors.
A more transparent arbitral process may well quiet some of the
fears of legitimate critics of the lack of transparency of the NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitral process, simply by providing an opportunity to
monitor the proceedings, and at least a chance of participating
directly through the amicus curiae process.380 Non-amendment
modifications to the NAFTA procedures should have the same effect,
particularly if Mexico can be convinced to introduce the same level
of transparency as the other two NAFTA governments.
It is apparent that procedural changes, particularly those requiring
a preliminary round on jurisdiction and competence issues, with the
threat of payment of costs and attorneys' fees if the moving party is
unsuccessful, are designed to and may well have a chilling effect on
380. See USTR Summary, supra note 197, at 6 (describing provisions designed
to ensure transparency, and also including a requirement that all documents
submitted to, or issued by, a tribunal be available to the public).
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new claims, particularly for claimants without deep pockets.381
However, somewhat more lawyer discipline, private and government
alike, would no doubt be welcome both to policy makers and arbitral
tribunals. The impact of the other changes, including the explicit
coverage of "investment authorizations" and "investment
agreements," and the incorporation of "fork in the road" provisions,
are likely to be less significant in general but important in specific
cases, and will require that actual and potential claimants and their
counsel be fully aware of the pitfalls.
Taken as a whole, Chapter 10 of the Chile FTA and Chapter 15 of
the Singapore FTA- and the many FTAs and BITs that are now or
soon will be incorporating thse same provisions-- represent a
significantly different investment protection package. While it may
quell some of the NAFTA, Chapter 11 critics who are concerned
about the United States as respondent host government, it is at least a
partial retreat from the high level of protection afforded to investors
in the past under the more traditional U.S. and other bilateral
investment treaties and under NAFTA, Chapter 11.
381. See Hirt, supra note 367, at 1010-11 (discussing the effects and criticism of
a similar provision, Rule 11, on claims in the United States including the
disincentive for claimants to pursue novel legal contentions).
